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The procedural standards for shareholder derivative suits have endured a
checkered history. Courts and commentators alike have failed to agree as to a
proper set ofprocedural standards for derivative suits. The Delaware courts and
the American Law Institute have each developed an elaborate and
comprehensive set of procedural standards that each claims properly balances
the competing policies regarding derivative suits. However, this Note argues that
both approaches have various weaknesses that detract from their utility and
soundness. Each approach alienates certain valid policies regarding the role of
shareholder derivative suits and corporate management.
This Note proposes a hybrid procedural approach that integrates the
strongest elements of the Delaware and the ALl approaches. This hybrid
approach reconciles the seemingly competing policies regarding shareholder
derivative suits and produces a set of procedural standards that makes the
derivative suit a viable legal mechanism for corporate shareholders, while still
respecting the role of corporate management in determining the best interests of
the corporation.
I. INTRODUCTION
A shareholder derivative action permits a shareholder to bring suit against
wrongdoers on behalf of the corporation, and it forces those wrongdoers to
compensate the corporation for the injury they have caused.1 Thus, the cause of
* This Note is dedicated to my parents, Tom and Brenda Ferrell-I am forever grateful for
your love and support. In addition, I would like to thank Tam McPherson, who is and always
will be my inspiration in life.
I See Thomas P. Kinney, Stockholder Derivative Suits: Demand and Futility Where the
Board Fails to Stop Wrongdoers, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 172, 172 (1994); Carol B. Swanson,
Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball,
77 MiNN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1993).
It should be noted that a derivative action is different than a direct action and carries with it
several different procedural requirements. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. The nature of the wrong
controls whether the shareholder asserts a derivative or a direct claim. See, e.g., In re General
Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1119, 1131 (D. Del. 1988) (looking to
the nature of the wrong alleged in the complaint and not the label employed by the plaintiffs in
determining whether an action was direct or derivative); Lipton v. News Int'l, Plc, 514 A.2d
1075, 1078 (Del. 1986) ('To determine whether a complaint states a derivative or an individual
cause of action, we must look to the nature of the wrongs alleged in the body of the
complaint... .'); Elster v. American Airlines, Inc., 100 A.2d 219,223 (Del. Ch. 1953) (noting
that "[t]he nature of the wrong alleged is what controls" whether a cause of action is direct or
derivative); Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 683 A.2d 818, 830 (N.J. 1996). "Thus, when the
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action actually belongs to the corporation, but a shareholder is permitted to assert
the cause of action where the corporation has failed to take action for itself 2
Although shareholder derivative suits have been in existence for well over a
century,3 the law-particularly the procedural law-governing these suits
remains varied and unsettled.4 Moreover, many of the issues surrounding
derivative suits have been, and still are, very controversial.5
injury complained of falls on the corporation or affects all stockholders equally, the cause of
action should be brought by the corporation or derivatively by the stockholders if the
corporation fails to act." Jesse B. Finkelstein et al., Derivative Suit Litigation, in 1 TIM 26TH
ANNUAL INSTI'UTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 543, 551 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B-866, 1994).
Examples of types of actions that are derivative in nature are "actions charging that the
directors wasted corporate assets, issued stock for inadequate consideration in order to entrench
themselves in office, arbitrarily rejected offers to acquire stock of the corporation, and
mismanaged the corporation such that the value of the stockholder's proportionate share of the
stock diminished." Id. at 551-52 (footnotes omitted); see also Kramer v. Western Pac. Indus.,
Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 353 (Del. 1988) (noting that claims of waste are derivative in nature);
Avacus Partners, L.P. v. Brian, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,232, at
91,214 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 1990), available in 1990 WL 161909; Cottle v. Standard Brands Paint
Co., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,306, at 96,429 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22,
1990), available in 1990 WL 34824.
In contrast, a direct action by a shareholder involves a claim for some alleged wrong that
injured the shareholder in his individual capacity. A direct action is one that exists
independently from the corporation or involves a contractual right held by the shareholder. See
In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 330 (Del. 1993); Cavalier Oil Corp. v.
Hamett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1143 (Del. 1989). Examples of direct actions include the following:
actions to enforce the shareholder's right to vote, claims that a transaction unfairly affects
minority shareholders, and claims that the directors' actions diluted only certain shareholders'
proportionate interests in the corporation. See Tr-Star Pictures, 634 A2d at 330; Harnett, 564
A.2d at 1143; Lipton, 514 A.2d at 1079.
2 See Strasenburgh, 683 A.2d at 829-30; Taormina v. Taormina Corp., 78 A.2d 473, 475
(Del. Ch. 1951); Valle v. North Jersey Auto. Club, 310 A2d 518, 521 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div.
1973) (stating that with derivative actions, "[t]he cause of action belongs to the corporation, not
the shareholders"); DEBORAH A. DEMOTr, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACroNs: LAW AND
PRACrICE § 2:01 (1994). -
3 See Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 450 (1881); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 331,341 (1855); DEMOTr, supra note 2, § 1:03, at 7-8 (citing Robinson v. Smith, 3
Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832)).
4 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Derivative Litigation Under Part VII of the ALI Pinciples
of Corporate Governance: A Review of the Positions and Premises, in CURRENT ISSuMS IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, at 237, 240 (ALI-ABA Course of Study No. CA53, 1995) (noting
that "[t]he derivative action has had a long, convoluted, and controversial history in American
law").
5 See, e.g., Glenn G. Morris, Shareholder Derivative Suits: Louisiana Law, 56 LA. L. REV.
583, 585 (1996); Carol B. Swanson, Corporate Governance: Sliding Seamlessly into the
Twenty-First Century, 21 J. CORP. L. 417, 437 (1996) (noting that "shareholder derivative suits
have been controversial since their inception").
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The major controversy surrounding shareholder derivative litigation stems
from the competing policies that underlie the derivative suit. One important
policy argument in favor of shareholder derivative suits is that they are an
invaluable procedural device in corporate law that allows shareholders to protect
the corporation's rights-which in actuality are the shareholders' rights.6 A
minority shareholder, who ordinarily would have no power to challenge or
control director malfeasance, can bring an action against corporate directors and
officers who have committed wrongful acts that injure the corporation.7 A
minority shareholder can thereby hold directors and officers legally and
financially accountable for their wrongdoing.8 Thus, the shareholder derivative
suit serves two important goals: (1) it deters future wrongful conduct on the part
of corporate management; and (2) it compensates the corporation for its injuries.9
6 See, e.g., Barrett v. Southern Conn. Gas Co., 374 A2d 1051, 1055 (Conn. 1977) ('If the
duties of care and loyalty which the directors owe to their corporations could be enforced only
in suits by the corporation, many wrongs done by directors would never be remedied."); Brown
v. Tenney, 532 N.E.2d 230, 232 (11. 1988) (stating that "[t]he derivative suit is a device to
protect shareholders against abuses by the corporation, its officers and directors, and is a vehicle
to ensure corporate accountability"); M.D. Bldg. Material Co. v. 910 Constr. Venture, 579
N.E.2d 1059, 1062 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) ('In the corporate setting, a derivative suit is a device to
protect shareholders against abuses by the corporation, its officers and directors.").
7 The alleged wrongdoers in a shareholder derivative action are not always corporate
directors or officers. Third parties that have injured the corporation in some way can also be
named as defendants in a derivative action. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538
(1970).
8 See supra note 6.
9 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A,2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (noting that 'he derivative
suit [is a] potent tool[ ] to redress the conduct of a torpid or unfaithful management'); Kinney,
supra note 1, at 172 (stating that "[d]erivative suits are praised for providing a single
shareholder with a vehicle for forcing management to compensate the injured corporation");
Swanson, supra note 1, at 1345 ("Absent derivative suits, individual shareholders would have
no access to compensation for injuries directly inflicted on their corporation").
However, this strong policy in support of derivative actions may be tempered somewhat
by what has occurred in practice. The assertion that such suits will compensate the corporation
and restore it to its financial condition prior to the wrongful conduct has not been entirely
accurate. In reality, derivative suits may not provide an injured corporation with much financial
gain at all. Furthermore, if the financial injury was relatively small in the first place, a derivative
suit may result in overall financial costs to the corporation. Forcing corporations to create
special independent committees and to appoint independent legal counsel to assist the
committees in reviewing the shareholders allegations creates substantial costs. See 2 ALI
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Reporter's
Note, at 12-14 (1994) [hereinafter 2 ALI PRINCIPLES]; George D. Hornstein, The Death Knell
of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CAL. L. REV. 123, 136-37 (1944); Thomas
M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class
Action Lavsuits, 60 B.U. L. REV. 542,545 (1980). For example, Roberta Romano, in her article
entitled The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991),
notes that any financial benefits realized by bringing a derivative suit are often marginal at best:
"[W]hile most suits settle, the settlements provide minimal compensation .... [P]er share
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However, courts and commentators have recognized that there are potentially
detrimental side effects to a shareholder derivative suit. For instance, the
derivative suit can lend itself to abuse by allowing opportunistic shareholders and
attorneys to impede the actual best interests of the corporation by filing fivolous
and unfounded strike suits.10
Furthermore, others believe that shareholder derivative suits must be
carefully constrained so that minority shareholders and the courts are not
permitted to unduly interfere with and second-guess directors' business
decisions. 11 They argue that a decision regarding whether a corporation should
bring a legal action against an alleged wrongdoer is a business decision, and, thus,
recoveries are small. In addition, monetary relief is much lower, and more infrequently
obtained, in derivative suits compared to class actions .... The principal beneficiaries of the
litigation therefore appear to be attorneys ... ." Id. at 84.
However, as stated above, financial compensation is not the only goal served by derivative
actions. Deterrence is also a justification. Shareholder derivative suits deter corporate officers
and directors from practicing wrongful behavior that is injurious to the corporation and its
shareholders. Thus, derivative actions can be found to create more responsible management
See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970) (noting that a successful
shareholder suit "'accomplishes a result which corrects or prevents abuse"' by the officers or
directors (quoting Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 101 N.W.2d 423, 426-27
(Minn. 1960))); Neese v. Richer, 428 N.E.2d 36, 42 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that
shareholders should be able to bring derivative suits "to redress a wrong or prevent a threatened
wrong ... even though such action might not result in 'pecuniary benefit"); State er rel. Weede
v. Bechtel, 56 N.W.2d 173, 183 (Iowa 1952) (stating that "stockholders' suits ... have been a
most wholesome, though inadequate remedy in deterring these intracorporate transgressions by
officers and directors"); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969) (noting that
the function of a derivative action is not only to compensate the corporation and shareholders,
but also to deter officers and directors from wrongdoing). But see Dennis J. Block et a].,
Derivative Litigation: Current Law Versus the American Law Institute, 48 Bus. LAW. 1443,
1483 (1993) (noting that derivative actions may also deter risk taking and innovation on the part
of directors, which may cause a company to lose its competitive edge in the market).
10 See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782, 785 (Del. 1981); ROGER J.
MAGNUSON, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION § 8.01, at 3 (1997); Kinney, supra note 1, at 172; see
also Stuart J. Baskin, Recent Developments in State Securities, Derivative and Corporate Law,
in SEcURmEs LrrIGATION 1996, at 449, 452 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 958, 1996) (noting that "all state jurisdictions closely scrutinize derivative suits and
seek to preserve the board's ability independently to decide whether to prosecute legal action on
behalf of the corporation"); Swanson, supra note 1, at 1340-41 (noting that some
commentators feel that "derivative litigation necessarily raises the specter of shareholder strike
suits and unduejudicial interference with business judgment ofmanagement').
11 See, e.g., Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) ("Tjhe derivative action
impinges on the managerial freedom of directors... "); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 ("[Tjhe
demand requirement is a recognition of the fundamental precept that directors manage the
business and affairs of corporations"); Marx v. Akers, 644 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1996) ("By
their very nature, shareholder derivative actions infringe upon the managerial discretion of
corporate boards."); Swanson, supra note 1, at 1340-41 (' The opposing view cautions that
corporations, not the courts, should resolve intemal conflicts ... ").
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it should be handled internally by the corporate directors and upper-level
management 12 Moreover, supporters of this position believe that such decisions
should be granted judicial deference and protected with a presumption of good
faith and reasonableness.13 In other words, the corporate directors, not the courts,
are in the best position to determine what is in the best interest of the corporation.
Therefore, the courts should grant tremendous judicial deference to corporate
decisions not to pursue litigation against one or more of its own directors or
officers. 14
Yet this policy argument is countered by the proposition that a decision by
the directors of a corporation regarding whether to pursue legal action against
fellow directors and officers is not a typical business decision. The directors who
will make the decisions regarding the propriety of bringing legal action move
within the same professional and social circles as the defendant-directors. Thus, a
structural bias15 prevents them from ever voting in favor of the derivative
litigation. 16 Thus, this view supports a more intense judicial scrutiny of the merits
of the derivative suit and less deference to the corporate directors' decision as to
whether a derivative action should go to trial.
These competing arguments regarding the policies that should be reflected by
the derivative suit drive the continuing controversy over the proper procedural
12 This argument is a more specific version of the age-old doctrine in corporate law that
the directors of a corporation-not the shareholders or the courts-should manage the
corporation's day to day activities and make the business decisions. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at
811 (noting that it is "[a] cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of the State of
Delaware... that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the
corporation").
13 This policy supports application of the "business judgment rule" to decisions of
corporate directors. The business judgment rule is "a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action was in the best interests of the company." Aronson, 473 A.2d at
812; see also Auerbach v. Bennett 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630-35 (1979).
14 SeeAuerbach, 47 N.Y.2d at 631-34.
15 
"Structural bias is the institutional symbiosis that exists when directors pass judgment
upon their fellow directors." Peter E. Kay, Director Conflicts of Interest Under the Model
Business Corporation Act, 69 WASH. L. REV. 207,227 (1994).
16 See, e.g., Hasan v. Clevetnist Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 377 (6th Cir. 1984) ("A
derivative action invokes a response of group loyalty so that even a 'maverick' director may
feel compelled to close ranks and protect his fellows from the attack of the 'strike suitor."'
(quoting John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 261,283 (1981))); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981)
(stating that, when independent directors participate on executive committees established to
evaluate litigation, "[t]he question naturally arises whether a 'there but for the grace of God go
I' empathy might not play a role"); Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d
709, 717-18 (Iowa 1983) (noting that where defendant-directors appoint the committee of
directors that will decide whether to allow the derivative action to continue, the court must be
cognizant of the possibility of structural bias).
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standards governing derivative litigation. This Note focuses on two of the most
important procedural elements of a shareholder derivative suit: (1) the demand
requirement; and (2) the standard of judicial review of a corporate committee's
decision that a derivative action should be terminated and dismissed. Both courts
and commentators have developed a variety of specific standards and rules that
make up both the demand requirement and the standards for judicial review. In
particular, the Delaware Supreme Court and the American Law Institute17 (ALI)
have developed two of the most comprehensive sets of procedural rules regarding
demand and judicial review.18
Part I of this Note provides a general explanation of both the demand
requirement and the standards of judicial review used by courts to evaluate
corporate decisions terminating derivative actions. Part III focuses specifically on
the Delaware and the ALI approaches regarding demand and judicial review.
Finally, Part IV proposes that a hybrid approach-combining the best aspects of
the ALI standards and the Delaware standards-is the best overall procedural
approach to derivative litigation.
II. THE DEMAND REQUIREMENT & JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEES
A. Demand in General
All jurisdictions have a demand requirement as one of the procedural steps in
17 In 1994, the ALI enacted its final draft of proposals regarding procedural and
substantive rules for derivative actions. These rules are set out in Part VII of the ALI Principles
of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations ("ALT Principles"). The ALI
Principles is an elaborate and exhaustive set of standards and procedures for derivative
litigation, and these rules reflect the ALI's views as to how the various competing policies
discussed previously should be balanced in procedural rules governing derivative actions.
While these proposals have spawned a substantial amount of law review commentary, courts
and legislatures have not yet adopted Part VII of the ALIPrinciples as law.
Delaware has also developed a comprehensive set of standards regarding the procedures
governing shareholder derivative suits. However, unlike the ALI Principles, Delaware has
developed its standards primarily through judicial decision.
18 The Delaware courts have created rules and standards in the areas of shareholder
demand and judicial review of demand-refusal that have proven to be very influential in other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., In re General Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. Litig., 726 F.2d 1075, 1083 (6th
Cir. 1984) (applying Ohio law); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 891 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying
Connecticut law); Peller v. Southern Co., 707 F. Supp. 525, 527 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (applying
Georgia law); Rosengarten v. Buckley, 613 F. Supp. 1493, 1500 (D. Md. 1985) (applying
Maryland law); Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795, 799-800 (E.D. Va.
1982) (applying Virginia law). However, other jurisdictions have also established approaches to
these two procedural issues that differ from the Delaware standards. In addition to the common
law in this area, many state legislatures have codified the procedural requirements that govem
shareholder derivative litigation.
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bringing a derivative action. 19 Demand is the procedure by which the shareholder
formally notifies the corporation of his or her allegations against the wrongdoers
and requests that the corporation authorize the shareholder to file a derivative
action.20 The demand requirement stage is the first major hurdle facing a
shareholder-plaintiff in his or her quest of carrying a derivative action to a trial on
the merits. Some jurisdictions have a demand procedure that requires a
shareholder to make demand upon the corporation before filing suit unless such
demand would be "futile."21 Thus, in these jurisdictions, an important issue
becomes what standard should be used for determining when demand would be
"futile." In contrast, other jurisdictions have a "universal demand rule" that
requires demand be made in all situations.22
19 See, e.g., Swanson, supra note 1, at 1349 ("All jurisdictions require that shareholders
make a demand on the corporation's board of directors before a derivative suit can be
brought.").
20 The Supreme Court, in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108-10
(1991), has held that demand is a matter of substantive law, and, thus, the demand rule of the
state of incorporation govems in federal court.
21 Delaware excuses demand in situations where it would be futile. See Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 809-11 (Del. 1984). Regarding the standard for determining "futility," see infra
Part mH.B.l.b. The "futility" standard is derived from Delaware Chancery Rule 23.1, which
states:
In a derivative action brought by I or more shareholders or members to enforce a right of a
corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or association having
failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall allege
that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which the
plaintiff complains or that the plaintiff's share or membership thereafter devolved on the
plaintiff by operation of law. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts,
if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or
comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff's failure to obtain the action or for
not making the effort.
DEL. CH. Cr. R- 23.1.
22 See 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.03, at 57. The American Bar Association in its
proposals on corporate law has also adopted a universal demand requirement. Under its
proposal, plaintiffs in a derivative action must make a demand upon the corporation in all cases,
and the commencement of a derivative action is not permitted until 90 days after demand is
made, unless the demand is rejected earlier. See 2 MODEL BusINEss CORPORATION Acr
ANNOTATED § 7.42 (3d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1996) [hereinafter MBCA]. The MBCA demand
rule, like the AL!Principles, excuses demand if the shareholder can show irreparable harm. See
id.
Twelve states have adopted some form of a universal demand requirement. See ARIz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 10-742 (West 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-722 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 607.07401(2) (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-742 (1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 450.1493a (West 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-7.42 (1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-
543 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2072 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:7.42 (Supp.
1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-40(b) (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-672.1 (Michie 1993);
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There are several justifications for the demand requirement The most
prominent justification is that the cause of action being asserted by the
shareholder belongs in reality to the corporation and not to the shareholder 3
Thus, requiring a shareholder to make demand is necessary because it allows the
board of directors, which is empowered as the management body of the
corporation,24 to make the initial review and determination regarding the
allegations, their validity, and the proper course of conduct that the corporation
should pursue. Another related rationale is that demand provides for potential
intracorporate resolution of a dispute before an official derivative action is filed
by notifying the corporation of the allegations being asserted. 25 This potentially
saves judicial resources by protecting the court from hearing cases that could be
resolved through remedies within the corporation.26 In addition, demand provides
WIS. STAT. § 180.0742 (1996).
23 See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,
631 (1979) (stating that "[d]erivative claims against corporate directors belong to the
corporation itself').
2 4 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1993) ('The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors... ."); see also Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259,275 (3d Cir.
1978) (noting that directors are responsible for deciding whether in their business opinion a
derivative suit is in the best interests of the corporation); Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932
(Del. 1993) (noting that directors are "empowered to manage" the corporation under Delaware
law); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991) (noting that directors manage the affairs
of the corporation); Aronson, 473 A2d at 811 ("A cardinal precept of... General Corporation
law.., is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the
corporation."); Auerbach, 47 N.Y.2d at 631 ("As with other questions of corporate policy and
management, the decision whether and to what extent to explore and prosecute such claims lies
within thejudgment and control of the corporation's board of directors.").
2 5 See, e.g., Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank, 870 F.2d 1168, 1173 (7th Cir. 1989) (describing
demand as initiating a "form of alternative dispute resolution" ); Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245,
247 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that demand may initiate a form of dispute resolution); Weiss v.
Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928, 940-41 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that demand forces
"'shareholders to exhaust intracorporate remedies"' (quoting Note, The Demand and Standing
Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. CI. L. REV. 168, 171 (1976)));
Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) (demand requirement "promote[s]
intracorporate dispute resolution"); 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.03 cmt. c, at 55
(suggesting that demand may help the corporation crystallize policies that help to remedy the
allegations); Robert K Payson, Dismissal of Derivative Actions: The Debate, 6 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 522, 527 (1981); Swanson, supra note 1, at 1350 ("Regardless of whether the corporation
rejects or supports the shareholder action, the demand may at least motivate the board to
consider difficult issues not previously given serious attention.").
26 See 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.03 cnt. c, at 55; see also Dennis J. Block et al.,
The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in Shareholder Litigation at the Turn ofthe Decade, 45
Bus. LAW. 469, 472-73 (1990) (noting that the demand requirement "serves the interest of
judicial economy"); Swanson, supra note 1, at 1351 ("[T]he demand requirement promotes
intracorporate dispute resolution that avoids unnecessary litigation.").
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a corporation with the opportunity to take over the litigation.27 However, perhaps
the most practical rationale for demand is that it "provides the corporation with an
opportunity t6 reject the proposed action or, if it is filed, to seek its early
dismissal. ' 8
B. Judicial Review in General
1. The Special Litigation Committee
Judicial review of special litigation committee decisions to terminate
derivative actions is another prominent element in derivative actions. If the board
of directors fails to get a derivative action dismissed at the demand stage, it will
typically appoint a special litigation committee to thoroughly review the
shareholder-plaintiffs allegations.2 9 Today, it is a well-settled rule that a board of
directors, even when a majority of its members are "interested," 30 has the power
27 See Elfenbein v. Gulf& W. Indus., 590 F.2d 445,450 (2d Cir. 1978); Swanson, supra
note 1, at 1350.
28 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.03 cmt. c, at 55; see also Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571
A.2d 767, 773 (Del. 1990) (ensuring that the corporation is provided the opportunity to continue
the action or dismiss it depending on the corporation's best interests).
29 A special litigation committee typically consists of one of the following: (1) acting
directors of the corporation who are clearly independent and disinterested in the derivative
action, or (2) directors who are elected to the board specifically for the purpose of serving on
the special litigation committee.
As soon as a corporation receives demand from a shareholder, or is otherwise notified that
a derivative action is to be filed, the board will often quickly appoint a special litigation
committee in hopes of expediting the termination of the suit. See Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692
A.2d 1042,1044 (Pa. 1997) (appointing a special litigation committee less than one month after
demand was made). However, the corporation must be careful about the timing of a special
litigation committee's appointment. For instance, if a shareholder files a derivative action
alleging demand is excused, and the board appoints a special litigation committee in response to
the complaint, a court might interpret this as a concession by the corporation that demand is
excused. See Abbey v. Computer Tech. & Communications Corp., 457 A.2d 368,374 (Del. Ch.
1983).
Therefore, the most prudent course of conduct for a corporation is to first file a motion to
dismiss for failure to make demand before appointing a special litigation committee to
investigate the allegations. See Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 776-77 (holding that the appointment of a
special litigation committee is not a concession that demand is excused if the motion to dismiss
for failure to make demand is filed before a special litigation committee is appointed).
30 The following is a good explanation of the general standard for determining whether a
director is "interested":
A director is interested if he will be materially affected, either to his benefit or detriment,
by a decision of the board, in a manner not shared by the corporation and the stockholders.
The '"mere threat' of personal liability in the derivative action does not render a director
interested; however, a "substantial likelihood" of personal liability prevents a director from
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to appoint a special litigation committee.31 The committee will perform a factual
investigation of the shareholder-plaintiff's allegations and will conclude its
investigation by reaching a decision as to whether the derivative action should be
continued or terminated? 2 The committee will also draft a report that details the
methods it used in investigating the allegations, its conclusions, and the facts
relied upon in reaching those conclusions.33 If the committee's final conclusion is
that the action should be terminated, the corporation will petition the court to have
the case dismissed based on the committee's conclusions.34 The court will then
review the committee's investigative methods-and possibly its factual findings
and conclusions-to determine whether the case should be dismissed.3 5
impartially considering a demand.
Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Del. Ch. 1995) (citations omitted); see also
Pogostin, 480 A.2d at 624 ("Directorial interest exists whenever divided loyalties are present, or
a director either has received, or is entitled to receive, a personal financial benefit from the
challenged transaction which is not equally shared by the stockholders.").
31 See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 781 (Del. 1981); Spiegel, 571 A.2d at
767-77. However, the Iowa Supreme Court in Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336
N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983), held that a board may not empower a special litigation committee
with the authority to recommend termination of a derivative suit where a majority of that
original board are defendants in the derivative action. See id at 715-16.
32 See, e.g., 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.04, at 69-71; Baskin, supra note 10, at
477; Finkelstein et al., supra note 1, at 588 ("[A] special litigation committee of disinterested
directors has the ability, in its business judgment, to determine whether the action should be
continued. Such ability derives from the duty of the board of directors to govem the affairs and
manage the assets of the corporation.").
More specifically, section 7.08 of the ALIPrinciples requires the board to decide whether
allowing the derivative action to continue would be "contrary to the best interests of the
corporation.' 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.08, at 112; see also Finkelstein et al., supra
note 1, at 586 ("mhe board will in some instances opt to appoint a special litigation committee
to investigate the shareholder's allegations, to determine whether the litigation is in the best
interests of the corporation and, if appropriate, to seek the termination of the derivative suit.").
Theoretically, the special litigation committee could conclude that the litigation is in the
best interests of the corporation and should be supported. In reality, however, the special
litigation committee almost always decides that the derivative suit should be terminated. See,
e.g., Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215,223 (Tenn. Ct App. 1992); see also DEMOTr, supra note
2, at § 5.04.
33 See 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.09, at 116-17; see also Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484
A.2d 501, 519-20 (Del. Ch. 1984) (discussing the comprehensiveness of the special
committee's report).
34 See, e.g., Will v. Engebretson & Co., 213 Cal. App. 3d 1033, 1040-41 (1989) (stating
that if the special committee decides to dismiss, then the corporation will move to dismiss based
on this decision); Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 964-65 (Del. Ch. 1985); 2 ALI PRINCIPLES,
supra note 9, § 7.09, at 116-17.
35 A court may or may not be permitted to inquire into the factual findings and
conclusions of the special litigation committee depending on the standard of judicial review
followed in that jurisdiction. The court may only be permitted to review the procedures used by
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2. Standards ofJudicial Review
The court's review of a special litigation committee's report and decision to
terminate a derivative action is a very important, and highly controversial, issue.36
The controversy surrounds the question of what level ofjudicial scrutiny the court
should apply when reviewing a special committee's decision to move for
dismissal of a derivative action. Some jurisdictions advocate a high level of
scrutiny by the court in which the court makes its own evaluation of the merits of
the derivative action.37 Other jurisdictions follow a very deferential approach in
which the court only reviews the procedures the special litigation committee
followed in reaching its decision. If those procedures indicate good faith and
reasonable investigation, then the court will defer to the committee's decision.38
the committee to investigate the matter. See infra Part II.B2.
36 There are at least five different standards presently being applied by various
jurisdictions across the country. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text; see also Charles
W. Murdock, Corporate Governance-The Role of Special Litigation Committees, 68 WASH.
L. REV. 79, 89 (1993) ("During the 1980s, a split of authority arose over what weight the
recommendation of a special litigation committee should be accorded and what the standard for
judicial review of the committee's decision should be.").
37 See Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 326-28 (N.C. 1987) (rejecting application of the
business judgment rule to the decision of the special litigation committee and instead adopting a
standard whereby the court must review the substantive decision reached by the special
committee to determine if it was reasonable and proper). This standard applies in all cases
regardless of whether demand was required or not.
38 See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 623-24 (1979). In other words, these courts
will apply the business judgment rule to the special litigation committee's decision. The
Auerbach court explained its standard of review of the special committee's decision to
terminate the derivative action as follows:
The latter, substantive decision falls squarely within the embrace of the business judgment
doctrine, involving as it did the weighing and balancing of legal, ethical, commercial,
promotional, public relations, fiscal and other factors familiar to the resolution of many if
not most corporate problems. To this extent the conclusion reached by the special litigation
committee is outside the scope of our review. Thus, the courts cannot inquire as to which
factors were considered by that committee or the relative weight accorded them in
reaching [ ] substantive decisions .... Inquiry into such matters would go to the very core
of the business judgment made by the committee. To permit judicial probing of such issues
would be to emasculate the business judgment doctrine as applied to the actions and
determinations of the special litigation committee. Its substantive evaluation of the
problems posed and its judgment in their resolution are beyond our reach.
Id. at 632-33; see also, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 770-72 (9th Cir. 1981)
(applying California law); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 686-89 (E.D. Mich.
1980) (applying Michigan law); Roberts v. Alabama Power Co., 404 So. 2d 629, 631-36 (Ala.
1981) (applying Alabama law); Engebretson & Co., 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1041-44 (following
Auerbach); Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 209-10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (applying
Minnesota law).
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Yet other jurisdictions steer a middle course by allowing some judicial review of
the reasonableness of the committee's decision but not permitting the court to
completely substitute its own judgment for that of the committee 9 Finally, other
jurisdictions apply different standards of judicial review depending on the type of
case or the underlying theories of liability being asserted by the shareholder-
plaintiff40
II. THE ALI APPROACH V. THE DELAWARE APPROACH
A. The ALIApproach
The ALI approach requires universal demand and sets up a bifurcated
standard of judicial review for when a corporation rejects demand and moves to
dismiss the derivative action. In addition, it sets forth the specific criteria that a
special litigation committee must meet in order to be permitted to review a
shareholder-plaintiff's allegations and to recommend what action the corporation
should take with respect to those allegations. Furthermore, the ALI has created
elaborate standards for judicial review of a special litigation committee's
recommendation that a derivative action should be terminated. These standards
draw a distinction between cases where the plaintiff is alleging violations of the
duty of loyalty and cases where he or she is alleging violations of the duty of
care.41
1. Universal Demand
Section 7.03 of the AL!Principles sets forth a "universal demand rule,"42
39 See Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 59 (Mass. 1990) (holding that, in addition to
inquiring into the procedural due care of the special litigation committee in deciding that the
derivative action should be terminated, the court must also "determine, on the basis of the
evidence presented, whether the committee reached a reasonable and principled decision").
40 For instance, Delaware provides different standards of review for cases where demand
is "excused" and cases where demand is "required." See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d
779, 788 (Del. 1981). The ALI standard is bifurcated with the specific standard of review
depending on whether the plaintiff is alleging a breach of the duty of care or the duty of loyalty.
See 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, §§ 7.08-7.10, at 116-31. Both the Delaware and the ALI
approaches will be discussed at length below. See infra Part IH.
41 The ALI Principles is a comprehensive set of standards and rules to be applied in all
areas of corporate law. However, this Note only focuses on the procedures mentioned above.
42 See 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.03, at 53. Specifically, section 7.03(a) states:
Before commencing a derivative action, a [share]holder... should be required to make a
written demand upon the board of directors of the corporation, requesting it to prosecute
the action or take suitable corrective measures, unless demand is excused under § 7.03(b).
The demand should give notice to the board, with reasonable specificity, of the essential
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which provides that a shareholder must make a written demand upon a
corporation's board of directors before he or she commences a derivative
action.43 This demand must be made in every case, unless the shareholder can
show that the corporation would suffer irreparable injury if filing of the action
were delayed.44 Furthermore, the demand should provide the board with notice of
the allegations being asserted by the shareholder and the specific facts being
relied upon in support of those allegations45 The court should dismiss a
derivative action that is filed before the board of directors has made a response to
the demand.4 6
Once this demand is made upon the corporation, the board of directors will
decide whether the litigation should be permitted to continue or whether demand
should be rejected. Typically the board will reject demand 47 Once the corporate
board of directors formally rejects the shareholder's demand, the shareholder may
immediately file the derivative action with the court.48 In addition, once the action
is filed, the board49 will typically move to dismiss the action based on its prior
facts relied upon to support each of the claims made therein.
IdL
43 This demand would consist of a request to the board that it take "suitable corrective
measures," such as taling over the litigation, authorizing the derivative action, or perhaps
resolving the dispute internally.
44 See Coffee, supra note 4, at 253.
45 See 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.03(a), at 53.
46 See i d § 7.03(d), at 53. However, a shareholder may be able to file a suit before a
response if the board fails to respond within a "reasonable time." Id.
47 However, a board could decide that the litigation should continue, and then it could
authorize the plaintiff-shareholder to continue the litigation on the corporation's behalf or could
even take over the litigation itself. Also, the corporation could respond to the shareholder
allegations through intracorporate resolution and thus eliminate the need for the derivative
action. See id. § 7.08 crnt. c, at 113.
4 8 See id § 7.03 cmt. f, at 59-61.
4 9 In a derivative action, the corporation is considered a nominal defendant along with the
defendants facing actual liability. Thus, the board of directors--as the managers of the
corporation-will file the motion to dismiss. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL § 16.3 (4th ed. 1996); see also Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d
767, 773 (Del. 1990) ("The nature of the derivative action is two-fold. 'First, it is the equivalent
of a suit by the shareholders to compel the corporation to sue. Second, it is a suit by the
corporation, asserted by the shareholders on its behalf, against those liable to it.'" (quoting
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984))); Kramer v. Western Pac. Indus., Inc., 546
A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988) (noting that a derivative action consists of two suits: (1) one against
the corporation seeking an order compelling the corporation to bring suit against the
wrongdoers, and (2) a second by the shareholders, on behalf of the corporation, against the
wrongdoers); Abramson v. Blakeley, 202 N.Y.S.2d 586, 591 (1960) ("While it is true that the
corporation is a necessary defendant, its role is nominal, and in actuality it is the plaintiff.").
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rejection of the plaintiff's demand.50 At this point, the court must decide whether
the board's demand rejection should be honored and the case dismissed, or
whether the action should continue.
a. Demand Rejection in Duty ofLoyalty Cases
The ALI has created a complex set of standards for courts to apply in
determining whether to honor the board's rejection.51 First, the shareholder, in his
or her complaint, must plead with particularity the facts that constitute the basis
for the shareholder's theories of liability.52 These facts must raise a "significant
prospect" that the defendant-directors violated some legal duty that they owed to
the corporation.53 Thus, if the shareholder is alleging that the defendant-directors
violated their duty of care to the corporation, then the complaint must plead
particularized facts that, if true, establish a violation of the business judgment
rule.54 Furthermore, if the shareholder is alleging that the directors violated their
50 See 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.03 cmt. f, at 58-59. Furthermore, the
corporation can make this motion to dismiss immediately after the plaintiff files the action. See
id. Also, at this point, the corporation may move to stay discovery under section 7.06 until the
motion is resolved. See id. For the specific rules governing discovery in this context, see 2 ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.06, at 104.
51 See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 104 (1991) (stating that under the
ALI approach, once demand has been rejected, the ALI provisions delineate "an elaborate set of
standards that calibrates the deference afforded the decision of the directors to the character of
the claim being asserted").
52 See 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.04(a), at 69-70.
53 See id.
54 Actually, the ALI approach requires the facts to raise a "significant prospect" that the
duty of care and the business judgment rule have been breached. See id.
In corporate law, whenever directors are accused of violating their duty of care in making
some business decision that affects the corporation, they are typically protected by the business
judgment rule. Plaintiffs must overcome the substantial protections of the business judgment
rule in order to hold directors liable. See, e.g., Munford, Inc. v. Valuation Research Corp., 98
F.3d 604, 611 (1 1th Cir. 1996); Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 256-58 (6th Cir. 1985);
Gearheart Indus., Inc., v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 720-21 (5th Cir. 1984). The ALI sets
forth its version of the business judgment rule and the duty of care in Part IV of the ALI
Principles. Specifically, section 4.01 states:
(a) A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director's or officer's
functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would
reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances. This
Subsection (a) is subject to the provisions of Subsection (c) (the business judgment rule)
where applicable.
(1) The duty in Subsection (a) includes the obligation to make, or cause to be made,
an inquiry when, but only when, the circumstances would alert a reasonable director or
officer to the need therefor. The extent of such inquiry shall be such as the director or
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duty of loyalty, then the complaint must contain facts that raise a "significant
prospect" that the directors' conduct did not meet the legal standards for the duty
of loyalty.55
officer reasonably believes to be necessary.
(2) In performing any of his or her functions (including oversight functions), a
director or officer is entitled to rely on materials and persons in accordance with §§ 4.02
and 4.03 (reliance on directors, officers, employees, experts, other persons, and
committees of the board).
(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute or by a standard of the corporation
[§ 1.36] and subject to the board's ultimate responsibility for oversight, in performing its
functions (including oversight functions), the board may delegate, fonnally or informally
by course of conduct, any function (including the function of identifying matters requiring
the attention of the board) to committees of the board or to directors, officers, employees,
experts, or other persons; a director may rely on such committees and persons in fulfilling
the duty under this Section with respect to any delegated function if the reliance is in
accordance with §§ 4.02 and 4.03.
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills the duty
under this Section if the director or officer.
(I) is not interested [§ 1.23] in the subject of the business judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent the
director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of the
corporation.
(d) A person challenging the conduct of a director or officer under this Section has
the burden of proving a breach of the duty of care, including the inapplicability of the
provisions as to the fulfillment of duty under Subsection (b) or (c), and, in a damage
action, the burden of proving that the breach was the legal cause of damage suffered by the
corporation.
I ALl PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATONS, § 4.01,
at 138-39 (1994) [hereinafter 1 ALI PRINCIPLES].
55 Along with the duty of care, the duty of loyalty is part of the overall fiduciary duty that
directors owe to the corporation. The duty of loyalty requires the directors and officers to
remain loyal to the corporation and to act in the corporation's best interests at all times. In other
words, the duty of loyalty requires directors and officers to place the interests of the corporation
above any personal financial interests they may have in a corporate transaction. See 18B AM.
JURL 2d Corporations § 1711 (1985). However, not all transactions in which directors have a
personal interest or stand to make a personal financial gain will violate the duty of loyalty, but
directors will have to meet a stricter standard. Directors must show that the transaction was
overall reasonable and fair to the corporation. See id.; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144
(1996) (explaining similar test under Delaware law); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744
F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that the burden of proof shifts in a duty of loyalty case to
the director when a "prima facie showing is made that directors have a self-interest in a
particular ... transaction"); In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. Shareholder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 66-68
(Del. 1995) (finding that directors did not breach the standards for the duty of loyalty);
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1148 (Del. Ch. 1994) (applying standard
under Delaware law); Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d
447, 453 (Iowa 1988) (noting that, in duty of loyalty actions, the director carries the burden of
proof on the issue of whether the action was "fair and reasonable" to the corporation).
The ALI's standards for the duty of loyalty are contained in section 5.02 of the AL!
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Additionally, section 7.04(a)(2) sets out the standards that the board of
directors must meet in making its decision to reject demand. If these standards are
not met, the board's rejection will not be given any weight by the court, and the
court will not grant the board's motion to dismiss.5 6 First, rejection of demand
must be in the form of a written statement.57 Second, the board's rejection of
demand will only be given "legal effect' if a majority of the directors are (1) not
"interested" 58 in the underlying transaction, and (2) capable of "objective
Pnnciples. It states in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule. A director [§ 1.13] or senior executive [§ 1.33] who enters into a
transaction with the corporation (other than a transaction involving the payment of
compensation) fulfills the duty of fair dealing with respect to the transaction if.
(1) Disclosure concerning the conflict of interest [§ 1.14(a)] and the transaction
[§ 1.14(b)] is made to the corporate decisionmaker [§ 1.11] who authorizes in advance or
ratifies the transaction; and
(2) Either
(A) The transaction is fair to the corporation when entered into;
(B) The transaction is authorized in advance, following disclosure concerning the
conflict of interest and the transaction, by disinterested directors [§ 1.15], or in the
case of a senior executive who is not a director by a disinterested superior, who could
reasonably have concluded that the transaction was fair to the corporation at the time
of such authorization;
(C) The transaction is ratified, following such disclosure, by disinterested directors
who could reasonably have concluded that the transaction was fair to the corporation
at the time it was entered into, provided (i) a corporate decisionmaker who is not
interested [§ 1.23] in the transaction acted for the corporation in the transaction and
could reasonably have concluded that the transaction was fair to the corporation; (ii)
the interested director or senior executive made disclosure to such decisionmaker
pursuant to Subsection (a)(1) to the extent he or she then knew of the material facts;
(iii) the interested director or senior executive did not act unreasonably in failing to
seek advance authorization of the transaction by disinterested directors or a
disinterested superior, and (iv) the failure to obtain advance authorization of the
transaction by disinterested directors or a disinterested superior did not adversely
affect the interests of the corporation in a significant way; or
(D) The transaction is authorized in advance or ratified, following such disclosure, by
disinterested shareholders [§ 1.16], and does not constitute a waste of corporate assets
[§ 1.42] at the time of the shareholder action.
(b) Burden of Proof. A party who challenges a transaction between a director or
senior executive and the corporation has the burden of proof, except that if such party
establishes that none of Subsections (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), or (a)(2)(D) is satisfied, the
director or senior executive has the burden of proving that the transaction was fair to the
corporation.
1 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 54, § 5.02, at 209-10.
56 Like section 7.04(a)(1), section 7.04(a)(2) requires the shareholder to plead with
particularity that the board's decision to reject does not meet the standards set out in section
7.04(a)(2). See 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.04(a)(2), at 70.
57 See id
58 See supra note 30. Section 1.23 of the ALI Principles contains its definition of director
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judgment in the circumstances." 59 If these preliminary requirements are met then
the court will review the board's demand rejection by applying one of the
standards set out in section 7.04(a)(2). The standard differs depending on the type
of case.60 If the shareholder is alleging that the underlying conduct or transaction
was a violation of the duty of fair-dealing6' or some other form of self-dealing,
then the board's decision to reject demand must satisfy an objective standard of
fairness under section 7.04(a)(2)(Q.6 2 Under this standard, the court asks: Could
the directors "reasonably have determined that rejection of the demand was in the
best interests of the corporation"'?63 Furthermore, under this standard, the
"interest" Basically, under this section a director will be deemed "interested" when: (1) the
director is a party to the underlying transaction or conduct; (2) the director has a pecuniary
interest in the transaction or conduct that would reasonably be expected to affect the director's
judgment in a manner adverse to the corporation; or (3) the director is subject to a controlling
influence by a party that is "interested" in the underlying transaction, and that controlling
influence could reasonably be expected to adversely affect the director's judgment See 1 ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 54, § 1.23, at 25-26. However, the mere fact that a director approved of
or acquiesced in the underlying transaction or conduct, without more, does not make that
director "interested" under the ALIPrinciples. See id § 1.23(c), at 25.
5 9 Coffee, supra note 4, at 255 (quoting 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.04(a)(2), at
70); see also infra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of "objective
judgment in the circumstances").
As section 7.04(aX2) implies, the option to reject the demand and then have the action
dismissed based upon this rejection is not available to a board of directors when a disinterested
majority does not exist, or when disinterested directors are too personally involved in the
conduct or transaction under review to be capable, as a group, of objective judgment in the
circumstances. See 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.03 cmt. f, at 59-61. In this situation, the
board will likely proceed under section 7.08, which sets forth the standard for appointing a
committee of disinterested directors who will then conduct a review and investigation of the
plaintiff's allegations pursuant to the standards contained in sections 7.09 and 7.10. See id.
§ 7.08, at 112. These sections are explained in Part m1 of this Note.
Furthermore, when the corporation cannot utilize the demand-rejection standard under
section 7.04(a)(2), its initial response to the demand need only consist of a statement that the
board has appointed a special litigation committee and has transferred the matter to the special
litigation committee for study and evaluation. See id. § 7.04(aX2), at 70. When the beard
follows this course of action, it must also inform the plaintiff that it will make its determination
within a reasonable time.
60 'Me AL! Principles define the standards for the duty of loyalty, the duty of care, and
other duties that the directors of a corporation must comply with when making corporate
decisions and transactions. See supra notes 54-55. Section 7.04 draws upon these standards in
creating the standards of judicial review of a board's demand rejection. In other words, the
standard of review that will apply under section 7.04(aX2) is determined by the legal standards
to which the underlying conduct is subject.
6 1 The ALIPI'nciples, throughout its provisions, uses the phrase "fair-dealing." This refers
to the duty of loyalty. For a discussion of the duty of loyalty under the ALIPrinciples, see supra
note 55.
62 See Coffee, supra note 4, at 256.
63 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.04(aX2)(C), at 70 (emphasis added); see also
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disinterested directors must also satisfy the business judgment rule by adequately
informing themselves before making a decision to reject.64 Thus, the court will
review the procedures that the board followed in making its decision to reject
demand to make sure they meet the standards of the business judgment rule, and
the court will also review the substance of the board's decision to make sure that
it is "reasonable."
The ALI has stated that this "reasonableness" standard is really a balancing
test.65 The court should balance the board's reasons and justifications for rejecting
demand against the legal merits of the case as pleaded with particularity in the
plaintiff's complaint.66 The commentary to section 7.04(a)(2) provides a good
explanation of the "trade-off' that occurs under this "reasonableness" standard:
In applying § 7.04(a), a court should balance the strength and seriousness of the
case set out by the particularized pleading of the plaintiff, as tested under
§ 7.04(a)(1), with that required under § 7.04(a)(2). The stronger and more serious
the case set out by the plaintiff's particularized pleading as tested under
§ 7.04(a)(1), the less the complaint must allege with particularity to establish
under § 7.04(a)(2) that there is a significant prospect the directors could
not.., have determined that rejection of the demand was in the best interests of
the corporation under § 7.04(a)(2)(C).67
Coffee, supra note 4, at 256.
64 See 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.04(a)(2)(C), at 70.
65 See id § 7.04 cmt. d, at 72; see also Swanson, supra note 1, at 1363 (noting that "the
business judgment rule shields the substantive bases for the committee's recommendation from
any judicial inquiry).
6 6 See Coffee, supra note 4, at 256-57.
67 Id. (quoting 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.04 cmt. d, at 72). Professor Coffee has
elaborated further on the implications of this reasonableness standard:
What this balancing test implies is that where an action is strong on its merits, less must be
shown by the plaintiff in response to the board's rejection of demand in order to raise a
"significant prospect" that the rejection was unreasonable (in a duty of fair dealing case).
In such a case, a reply to demand that is only conclusory or that "does not state the reasons
for the disinterested directors' rejection should be given only limited weight as against a
particularized allegation that strongly raises a significant prospect of a violation under the
standard of § 7.04(a)(1)." Stated more simply, the "stronger and more serious the showing
under § 7.04(a)(1), the more difficult it will be to dismiss the action in the absence of a
statement of equivalently credible reasons for the rejection of the reply."
Id. at 257 (citations omitted); see also Kinney, supra note 1, at 184 ("The [balancing] test
requires that the more serious the wrongdoing, the less particularized the allegations need be
that the rejection was unreasonable. Also, the more conclusory the corporation's reply, the less
weight it is given.").
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b. Demand Rejection in Duty of Care Cases
A different standard for judicial review applies in duty of care cases.68 If the
underlying transaction involves an alleged violation of the duty of care, then the
board's decision to reject demand will conclusively terminate the case unless the
plaintiff can prove, through his or her complaint, that the board's decision to
reject demand fails to meet the standards of the business judgment rule.69 This
standard is very deferential to a board's decision to reject demand.
The ALI standard that applies to duty of loyalty cases provides the court with
more discretion to review the merits of the case7 than the business judgment rule
standard the ALI proposes to be applied in duty of care cases.71 Thus, the plaintiff
has a much better chance of getting past the demand stage in duty of loyalty cases
than in duty of care cases.72
2. Judicial Review of a Special Litigation Committee
a. General Overview
As previously stated, there are various ways that a shareholder can get past
the demand stage of a derivative action under the ALTPrinciples: (1) the board's
rejection of demand may not be given any legal weight by the court under section
7.04(a)(2) because a majority of the entire board was not "disinterested" or
because the board members making the decision to reject were not "capable as a
68 See 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.04(aX2)(B), at 70; see also supra note 54
(discussing the duty of care under the AL/Principles).
69 See Coffee, supra note 4, at 256; see also supra note 54 (discussing the business
judgment rule).
Section 4.01(c) contains the ALI's business judgment rule. Generally, in order to get the
protections of the business judgment rule under section 4.01(c), directors (1) must be
disinterested, (2) must reasonably inform themselves about the subject matter of the underlying
transaction, and (3) must have made the business decision in good faith. See I ALI PRINCIPLES,
supra note 54, § 4.01(c), at 139.
70 At the demand-rejection stage, the court does not actually review the merits of the
underlying allegations through the traditional sources of evidence such as sworn testimony,
affidavits, depositions, and interrogatories. Rather, the court must assume that all of the facts
alleged in the shareholder's complaint are true and, based upon that, must decide whether the
board's rejection of demand was "reasonable.' See 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.04(a)
cmt. c, at 72.
71 However, this standard by no means permits intensive judicial review.
72 It must be remembered that under the ALI Principles, if the court finds that one of the
preliminary requirements of section 7.04(aX2) is not met, such as a majority of the board is not
"disinterested" in the underlying allegations, then the court does not even have to review the
board's decision to reject. Instead, the board's motion to dismiss will be denied and the case
will continue.
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group of objective judgment in the circumstances"; 73 or (2) the court may decline
the motion to dismiss because it finds that the plaintiff pleaded with particularity
facts sufficient enough to raise a "significant prospect" that the board's decision to
reject did not satisfy the standards of section 7.04(a)(2).74
Once a shareholder has successfully guided a derivative action past the
demand stage, the board of directors will appoint a special litigation committee to
review the allegations being asserted by the shareholder.7 5 The committee will
conduct an extensive investigation of the allegations and will eventually reach a
conclusion as to whether continuing the derivative action would be in the best
interests of the corporation. If it decides that the derivative suit should be
terminated, the committee will petition the court to dismiss the case. The court
will then review the committee's report and will decide whether to dismiss the
action. The key issue here is what level of judicial review should be applied 76
The ALI has developed a complex set of standards that govern this entire
process.77
b. The Special Litigation Committee under the ALIPrinciples
i. Section 7. 08-Dismissal of a Derivative Action Based
on a Motion By a Committee
Section 7.08 basically states that the court should dismiss a derivative action
against a corporate director or executive if the following three criteria are met (1)
a special litigation committee appointed by the original board determines that the
derivative action is "contrary to the best interests of the corporation
and... request[s] dismissal of the action"; 7 (2) the procedures set forth in section
7.09 are substantially complied with by the committee;79 and (3) the committee's
73 2 ALI P NCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.08 cmt. c, at 72.
74 See id
75 See Coffee, supra note 4, at 258 (noting that "if the complaint survives the § 7.04(a)
hurdle, the plaintiff still does not proceed automatically to discovery and trial"). It should be
noted that the ALl Pfinciples does not require a corporation to wait until the court has denied
the board's rejection of demand and accompanying motion to dismiss before it may appoint a
committee. Rather, the corporation may perform an initial screening of its original board
members in order to see if a majority of its directors are disinterested and capable of an
objective evaluation as required under section 7.04(a)(2). If it finds that it does not meet these
requirements, the board may choose to forego an attempt to dismiss the action based on demand
rejection and may immediately appoint a committee to begin investigating the shareholder's
allegations.
7 6 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
77 These standards are contained in sections 7.08 through 7.10.
78 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.08(a), at 112.
79 See id. § 7.08(b), at 112.
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determination satisfies the applicable standard of judicial review set forth in
section 7.10(a).80
Section 7.08 sets up a two-step test that must be satisfied before a court will
dismiss a derivative action. The first step is a procedural test contained in section
7.09. If the committee complies with section 7.09, the court will then proceed to
the second step.81 The second step, which is contained in section 7.10, requires
that the committee's decision to terminate be subjected to some standard of
substantive judicial review.
ii. Section 7.09--Proceduresfor Requesting Dismissal
of a Derivative Action
In order for a court to give any legal weight to the committee's decision to
terminate a derivative action, four procedural requirements must be satisfied: (1)
the committee should be composed of two or more persons who are not
interested82 in the underlying derivative action and are "capable of objective
judgment in the circumstances"; 83 (2) the committee must acquire the assistance
of counsel84 or other agents as may be necessary to assist the committee in
80 See id. § 7.08(c), at 112.
81 See.id § 7.09 cmt. c, at 118.
82 The AL Principles defines "interest," for purposes of derivative actions, in section
1.23(c). Section 1.23(c) states that a director is not interested if both the director is named as a
defendant in the derivative action "based only on the fact that the director approved of or
acquiesced in the transaction or conduct that is the subject of the action" and the complaint does
not otherwise allege "facts that.. . raise a significant prospect that the director would be
adjudged liable to the corporation or its shareholders" I ALI PRINCI'LES, supra note 54,
§ 1.23(c), at 25; see also supra note 58. This definition thus permits "nominal defendants"--
directors who are named as defendants in the complaint because they approved of or voted for
the alleged transaction but who were not the major players in the transaction--to serve on a
committee that will investigate the shareholder's allegations and determine whether the
derivative action should be terminated. See 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.09 cmt. g, at
122-23.
83 See 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.09(a), at 116. A committee must satisfy two
requirements to be considered "capable of objective judgment in the circumstances.' First, the
committee must "be able to understand and evaluate the transaction at issue." Id. § 7.09 cmt. g,
at 122-23. Second, there should not be any "relationships" between any of the committee
members and the defendant-directors that could bias the committee's investigation. See id. "For
example, a director who was the close personal friend and next-door neighbor of the defendant
would probably lack this capacity and should not serve on the committee." Id. This standard is
similar to the standard used by Delaware courts in determining if a director is "independent"
84 See id. § 7.09 cmt. a, at 117. The ALI Principles, unlike Delaware and other
jurisdictions, does not require that the counsel who assists the special litigation committee be
"independenf' of the corporation. See id § 7.09 cmt. h & Reporter's Note 4, at 123, 127.
Therefore, the corporation's in-house counsel is permitted to serve, provided that certain
requirements are met. For instance, the appointed counsel must be capable of exercising
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reaching an informed judgment;85 (3) the committee's determinations should be
based upon a review and evaluation that is sufficient to satisfy the standard of
review applicable under section 7.10; and (4) the committee must prepare a
"report or other written submission setting forth the... committee's
determinations in a manner sufficient to enable meaningful judicial review."86 If
these four criteria are met, the court should proceed to review the committee's
conclusions pursuant to the applicable standard under section 7.10.
iii. Section 7.10-Standards ofJudicial Review of a Committee's
Decision to Recommend Dismissal of a Derivative Action
Section 7.10 sets forth the applicable standards for judicial review of a special
litigation committee's decision to terminate a derivative action. It provides a
"bifurcated standard of judicial review."87 Section 7.10(a)(2) provides that if the
"gravamen" of the underlying derivative action alleges a violation of the duty of
loyalty,88 or if the action alleges a "knowing and culpable violation of law' 89 (or
other violations of the duty of care to which the business judgment rule is not
applicable), then the court must apply the following standard in determining
whether to dismiss the action based on the committee's report: "[he court
should dismiss the action if the court finds... that the board or committee was
adequately informed under the circumstances and reasonably determined that
dismissal was in the best interests of the corporation, based on grounds that the
court deems to warrant reliance."9 0
professional judgment under the circumstances. See id. § 7.09 cmt. h, at 123. Thus, if in-house
counsel is in a subordinate position in the corporation and must always report to the officers or
directors, then in-house counsel is not permitted to assist the comnittee under section 7.09
because it would be deemed "interested" under the definition in section 1.23(a)(4). See id.
Furthermore, the special litigation committee is expected to do most of the investigatory work
itself and should only look to counsel for supplementary assistance. In other words, the
committee is not permitted to rely on an investigation performed completely by the special
counsel. See id. § 7.09 cmt. h & Reporter's Note 4, at 123, 127.
85 The counsel or other agents must be "capable of exercising professional judgment
under the circumstances." Coffee, supra note 4, at 258.
86 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, § 7.09 cmt. a, at 117.
87 Coffee, supra note 4, at 258.
88 The duty of loyalty is referred to as the duty of fair dealing throughout the AL!
Principles. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
89 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.10(a)(2), at 130.
90 Id. (emphasis added). This standard calls for the court to first evaluate the committee's
methods of investigation to determine whether they were adequate. Then, it requires the court to
review the conmittee's conclusion to determine whether the decision was "reasonable." This
standard permits some subjective evaluation by the court of the merits of the plaintiff's
allegations because the rule contains the language: "on grounds that the court deems to warrant
reliance." Id.
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However, the ALI Principles provides a different standard of review if the
"gravamen of the [underlying] claim" is that the defendant(s) violated a duty of
care or some other duty that is protected by the business judgment rule.91 In that
case "the court should dismiss the [plaintiff's] claim unless it finds that the
board's or committee's determinations fail to satisfy the requirements of the
business judgment rule."92
In general, the standard of review that vill apply under the ALI Principles is
dictated by whether the underlying claim alleges violations of the duty of loyalty
or the duty of care.93 Committee decisions in duty of loyalty cases will receive
more searching judicial scrutiny, while decisions to terminate in duty of care
cases will be given the deference that is customary of the business judgment
rule.94 The duty of loyalty standard does allow the court, to some extent, to
review the committee's substantive conclusions in order to evaluate their
reasonableness, but it does not permit the court completely to apply its own
judgment and evaluation of the merits of the case.
B. The Delaware Approach
1. Delaware's Demand Rule: Demand-Required v. Demand-Excused
Delaware does not have a universal demand requirement. Under Delaware
91 Id. § 7.10(a)(1), at 129-30.
92 Id. Section 4.01(c) of the ALIPrinciples articulates its version of the business judgment
rule. See supra note 54.
93 For a discussion of the rationales behind the ALI's distinction between the duty of
loyalty and the duty of care, see infra Part IV.C.
Section 7.10(b) provides an additional requirement to the standard of review. It provides
that the court should not dismiss the plaintiffs action if dismissal of the case would allow a
defendant (or an associate) to retain a "significant improper benefit" 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra
note 9, § 7.10(b), at 130.
94 This bifurcated standard of judicial review is similar to the standards of review of
demand-rejection under section 7.04(a)(2). Under both section 7.04(a)(2) and section 7.10, the
standard of review is directly linked to the legal standard that applies to the underlying
transaction (duty of loyalty or duty of care). However, there are some significant differences.
The ALIPrinciples provides:
[Tjhere should usually be a fuller evaluation by the... committee when a motion is made
under § 7.08 [and § 7.10] than when a motion on the pleadings is made under
§ 7.04(a)(2). ... In general, § 7.04(a) envisions a preliminary screening of
the... "significant prospect" tests of § 7.04(a)(l)-(2). In contrast; although the depth and
scope of the inquiry under [§ 7.10] will depend upon the gravity and plausibility of the
plaintiff's allegations, the review and evaluation contemplated by [§ 7.10] is likely to be
more extensive than that required simply to reject demand under § 7.04(a)(2).
2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.08 cmt. c, at 113-14.
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law, the rule is that a demand must always be made upon the corporation before
filing a derivative suit unless making the demand would be "futile."95 When
making demand would be futile, the shareholder can file the derivative action
without making demand on the corporation.96 These are known as "demand-
excused" cases, while cases where demand must be made are called "demand-
required" cases.97
a. Demand-Required Cases-When Demand is Made and Refused
When demand is required to be made and it is subsequently rejected by the
board of directors, the board's decision to dismiss the derivative suit will be
respected unless it was "wrongful (i.e., unless it was not the product of a valid
exercise of business judgment).9 8 In this situation, plaintiffs may not merely
make a conclusory statement in their complaint that the refusal was "wrongful."99
Rather, the plaintiff must allege with particularity facts sufficient to rebut the
presumption that the board's decision is protected by the business judgment
rule.100 Therefore, when a board refuses demand, the only issues to be examined
are the board's good faith, the reasonableness of its investigation,101 and whether
the board members making the decision were "independent" and
"disinterested '1 02 in the underlying transaction. 10 3 Furthermore, in demand-
95 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813-14 (Del. 1984). For a discussion of the
standard for determining "futility," see infra Part IlhB.l.b.
9 6 See, e.g., Rales v. Blasband, 634 A2d 927, 933 (Del. 1993); Levine v. Smith, No.
Civ.A. 8833, 1989 WL 150784, at *4-5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1989, revised May 21, 1990), af'd,
591 A.2d 194 (Del. 1991).
9 7 See Swanson, supra note 1, at 1365-66.
98 Finkelstein et al., supra note 1, at 562; see also Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025,
1030 (2d Cir. 1982); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813; Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779,784
(Del. 1981).
The exact procedural setting in which this would take place is as follows: The shareholder
would make demand on the corporation, and the disinterested members of the board would
respond that demand had been refused. Then the shareholder would file the derivative action,
and very soon thereafter the corporation would make a motion to dismiss based upon its
rejection of demand. The court would then apply the business judgment rule to the board's
decision. Thus, in most cases where it is determined that demand must be made upon the
corporation, that will mark the end of the derivative suit because the courts will be extremely
deferential to the board's decision to reject demand and will dismiss the case.
99 See, e.g., Allison v. General Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1122-23 (D. Del. 1985).
100 See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 211 (Del. 1991); Mount Moriah Cemetery v.
Moritz, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,900, at 99,442 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 4, 1991), available in 1991 WL 50149.
101 See Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767,777 (Del. 1990); Thorpe v. Cerbco, Inc., 611
A.2d 5, 11 (Del. Ch. 1991); Levine, 1989 WL 150784, at *3.
102 See supra note 30 for a discussion of the definition of "interested." Director
"independence" is a concept very closely related to director "interest':
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required cases in which the board has refused demand, the plaintiff is not entitled
to any discovery in trying to prove that demand was wrongfully refused.10 4 Thus,
"whether the business judgment rule protects the board's rejection of a demand
from judicial scrutiny must be decided solely from the well-pleaded allegations of
the complaint."'1 05
b. Demand-Excused Cases-Proving "Futility"
Because of the difficulty of successfully pleading that refusal of demand was
wrongful, shareholders will often choose to file a derivative action without
making demand at all.106 Demand is only excused in cases where making
demand would be a "futile" act.107 Delaware has developed a two-prong test for
determining demand "futility" and, thus, for determining when demand is
Even if a director has no personal interest in a decision, his discretion must also be free
from the influence of other interested persons.... A director is independent if he can base
his decision "on the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than extraneous
considerations or influences."
Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Del. Ch. 1995) (quotingAronson, 473 A.2d at 816);
see also Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A2d 70, 73 (Del. 1997) (using the
terms "independent" and "disinterested" interchangeably).
103 See Ash v. IBM, Inc., 353 F.2d 491,493 (3d Cir. 1965); Allison, 604 F. Supp. at 1122;
Scattered Corp., 701 A.2d at 73; Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 777 ("[W]henever any action or inaction
by a board of directors is subject to review according to the traditional business judgment rule,
the issues before the Court are independence, the reasonableness of its investigation and good
faith....").
Furthermore, by electing to make demand, the plaintiff-shareholder is conceding the
board's independence. Thus, only reasonableness of investigation and good faith need to be
examined in determining whether the board's decision meets the business judgment rule. See
Scattered, 701 A.2d at 73; Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927,935 n.12 (Del. 1993); Levine, 591
A.2d at 212; Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 777; Charal Inv. Co. v. Rockefeller, [1995-1996 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,979, at 93,761-62 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 1995), available in
1995 WL 684869; Thorpe, 611 A.2d at 10.
104 See Lewis v. Hilton, 648 F. Supp. 725,727 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Allison, 604 F. Supp.
at 1120; Levine, 591 A.2d at 208-10.
105 Finkelstein et al., supra note 1, at 565; see also Levine, 591 A.2d at 210 (stating that
the lower court properly considered the "reasonable doubt" standard of Aronson as ultimately
controlling its determination of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint).
106 See, e.g., Levine, 591 A.2d at 212; Finkelstein et al., supra note 1, at 565 ("Because of
the relative difficulty of successfully alleging the wrongful refusal of a demand, shareholders
wishing to prosecute a derivative action on behalf of a corporation will often opt to commence
litigation without making a demand at all."); Kinney, supra note 1, at 175 (noting that because
shareholders are "[a]ware of this deferential treatment to demand refusal, many plaintiffs now
avoid demand by filing suit and pleading to the court that demand would have been futile").
107 See, e.g., Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952 (Del. 1992); Spiegel, 571
A.2d at 774; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984).
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excused. This test was first articulated in Aronson v. Lewis, in which the court
stated:
[1n determining demand futility the Court of Chancery in the proper exercise of
its discretion must decide whether, under the particularized facts alleged, a
reasonable doubt is created that (1) the directors are disinterested and
independent and (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a
valid exercise of business judgment Hence, the Court of Chancery must make
two inquiries, one into the independence and disinterestedness of the directors
and the other into the substantive nature of the challenged transaction and the
board's approval thereof. 108
i. The First Aronson Prong
Under the first prong of the Delaware approach, a plaintiff must allege
particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt that the directors who made the
decision to reject demand were independent and disinterested.'0 9 Moreover, the
Delaware Supreme Court has held that it must be shown that a majority of the
board members are interested or not independent in order to satisfy the
standard. 110 The Aronson court stated that a director's "interesf' can be
established by showing either that the directors appear on both sides of the
underlying transaction or that they derived some personal benefit from the
transaction in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves
upon the stockholders generally.111 In addition, the director's self-interest must be
material.112
The Aronson court also articulated the meaning of director independence:
"Independence means that a director's decision is based on the corporate merits of
the subject before the board rather than extraneous considerations or
influences."'1 13 The most typical manner in which a plaintiff will try to establish
108 473 A.2d at 814 (emphasis added).
109 See id.
110 See id. at 815 n.8.
111 See id. at 812; see also Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984). Finkelstein
notes:
[D]irectors may be interested, however, even if their interest in a particular transaction is
not, strictly speaking, a financial one. Such forms of self-interest as actions to perpetuate
one's self in office, and acquisition by a board of the right to vote a significant amount of
stock if pleaded with particularity, may be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt that the
directors were disinterested.
Finkelstein et al., supra note 1, at 569-70.
112 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345,362-63 (Del. 1993).
113 473 A.2d at 816; see also Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 362; Pogostin, 480 A.2d at 624.
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lack of independence is by alleging that a majority of the board members are
"controlled" by one of the interested defendants. 114 To prove control, "It]here
must be coupled with the allegation of control such facts as would demonstrate
that through personal or other relationships the directors are beholden to the
controlling person." 115
I. The Second Aronson Prong
If a plaintiff is unable to establish demand futility under the first prong by
pleading interest or lack of independence on the part of the board members, then
the plaintiff must try to satisfy the second prong of Aronson by alleging
particularized facts that create a reasonable doubt that "the challenged transaction
was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment" 116 The
business judgment rule requires both substantive due care and procedural due
care.1 17 Under Delaware law, to establish a breach of the business judgment rule,
The Aronson court further elaborated upon why the business judgment rule will not apply when
"independence" is lacking: "The requirement of director independence inhers [sic] in the
conception and rationale of the business judgment rule. The presumption of propriety that flows
from an exercise of business judgment is based in part on this unyielding precept." Aronson,
473 A.2d at 816.
114 See, e.g., Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188 (Del. 1988); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815-
16. This alleged controlling person will be one of the defendants alleged to have committed the
wrongdoing that is the subject of the derivative action. However, it is not an easy task to show
that the directors rejecting demand are "controlled" by an interested director. Mere conclusory
or speculative allegations of control will not suffice.
115
.Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815 (citing Mayer v. Adams, 167 A.2d 729, 732 (Del. Ch.
1961)) (emphasis added). The Aronson court further stated:
[E]ven proof of majority ownership of a company does not strip the directors of the
presumptions of independence, and that their acts have been taken in good faith and in the
best interests of the corporation....
We conclude that in the demand-futile context a plaintiff charging domination and
control of one or more directors must allege particularized facts manifesting "a direction of
corporate conduct in such a way as to comport with the wishes or interests of the
corporation (or persons) doing the controlling."
Id. at 815-16 (quoting Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 123 (Del. Ch. 1971)).
116 Id. at 814.
117 See, e.g., Grobow, 539 A.2d at 189. Procedural due care means that the board followed
careful procedures and informed itself properly before making the business decision.
Substantive due care means that the actual decision that was made by the directors was
reasonable. See id. at 189-90; Abrams v. Koether, 766 F. Supp. 237, 251 (D.NJ. 1991)
(discussing the standards of procedural due care and substantive due care); Decker v. Clausen,
15 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 1022, 1028-29 (1990), available in Civ.A. Nos. 10,684, 10,685, 1989 WL
133617 (Del. Ch. Nov. 6, 1989) (stating that the business judgment "analysis includes the
question of whether the directors fulfilled their duty of procedural due care, by becoming fully
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the plaintiff must establish either substantive or procedural gross negligence on
the part of the directors making the decision or conducting the lransaction. 118
Regarding substantive due care, in order for plaintiffs to establish demand
futility under the second prong of Aronson, they must allege particularized facts
that support a claim that the underlying transaction which is the subject of the
derivative action amounted to corporate waste.119 The standard for establishing
that a transaction is a waste of corporate assets is whether, "what the corporation
has received is so inadequate in value that no person of ordinary, sound business
judgment would deem it worth that which the corporation has paid."120
Procedural due care under the business judgment rule pertains to the methods
and procedures the directors instituted and followed in investigating the subject
matter about which they made a business decision. Therefore, to have demand
excused on procedural grounds, plaintiffs must allege particular facts that show
that the directors were grossly negligent in failing to adequately investigate and
inform themselves about the subject matter of the challenged transaction before
entering into that transaction. 121
If the plaintiff can satisfy either of the two prongs of Aronson, the
informed, and their duty of substantive due care, by not engaging in, e.g., a waste of corporate
assets"); In re Prudential Ins. Co. Derivative Litig., 659 A.2d 961,974 (NJ. 1995) (noting that a
valid business judgment must meet the requirements of procedural due care and substantive due
care).
118 See Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989);
Grobow, 539 A.2d at 190; Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 530 (Del. 1987); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779,787 (Del. 1981).
119 See Grobow, 539 A2d at 189. In other words, a decision by a director that results in
waste of corporate assets constitutes gross negligence on the part of that director, and thus
shreds the protections of the business judgment rule. See Benerofe v. Cha, CA. No. 14614,
1996 WL 535405, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 12, 1996); Stein v. Orloff, 11 DEL.J. CORP. L. 312, 314
(1986), available in No. 7276, 1985 WL 11561, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 30, 1985); Kaufman v.
Beal, Nos. CIV.A. 6485, 6526, 1983 WL 20295, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 1983).
120 Grobow, 539 A.2d at 189; see also Benerofe, 1996 WL 535405, at *8; In re Rexene
Corp. Shareholders Litig., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,010, at 90,058
(Del. Ch. May 8, 1991), available in 1991 WL 77529; Stein, 11 DEL. J. CoRP. L. at 314; Saxe
v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602,610 (Del. Ch. 1962).
121 See Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank, 870 F.2d 1168, 1172 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that
plaintiffs must plead "specific facts describing what steps the directors did not take in informing
themselves or how they could have better informed themselves before entering into the
challenged transactions"); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 364, 366 (Del.
1993); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991); Citron, 569 A.2d at 66 (noting that to
violate the business judgment rule, the director must be grossly negligent in failing to inform
himself); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (stating that gross negligence is the "proper standard
for determining whether a business judgment reached by a board of directors was an informed
one"); In re Sea-Land Corp. Shareholders Litig., 642 A.2d 792, 807 (Del. Ch. 1993) ('The
standard for determining whether a board decision was sufficiently informed is gross
negligence."); Finkelstein et al., supra note 1, at 575-76.
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corporation's motion to dismiss will be denied and the action will continue.
However, if the plaintiff cannot establish demand futility, then the action will be
dismissed.122
2. Judicial Review of a Special Litigation Committee
After a shareholder establishes demand futility and, thus, the derivative action
is not dismissed, the corporation will typically appoint a special litigation
committee.1 23 Delaware has developed a standard ofjudicial review that is linked
directly to whether the case is a demand-excused case or a demand-required
case.124 If the case requires demand to be made upon the corporation, then the
standard of review is the business judgment rule standard.125 Thus, the motion to
dismiss will be granted unless the plaintiff can plead with particularity facts
showing that the demand rejection was "wrongful."'126 However, if the plaintiff is
able to establish that demand would have been futile, then the standard of review
is different
For demand-excused cases, the Delaware Supreme Court, in Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado,127 articulated a two-step test to determine whether to dismiss a
derivative action pursuant to a special litigation committee's decision that the
action should be terminated. The court stated:
122 Typically, it will be dismissed without prejudice so that plaintiffs can either amend
their compliant to make a more particularized factual pleading or so that they can make demand
upon the corporation. However, in reality, if the court finds that failure to make a demand was
not excused, this will likely mark the end of the derivative litigation because any demand that is
made will be rejected by the corporation, and this rejection will be protected by the business
judgment rule. SeeAronson, 473 A.2d at 813.
12 3 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. This committee will thoroughly investigate
the shareholder's allegations in order to make a determination of whether the litigation is in the
best interest of the corporation. Typically, the special litigation committee will determine that
the derivative action is not in the best interests of the corporation and will seek termination of
the derivative action. The committee's decision will then be subject to judicial review. Some of
the most common reasons given by special litigation committees for recommending
termination of derivative actions are "that the action's continuation would (1) undermine
employee morale, (2) create an adversarial relationship between the board and management, (3)
result in public stigmatization and loss of goodwill, and (4) subject the corporation to liability
for indemnification and related expenses." 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.10 Reporter's
Note 8, at 160.
124 See Swanson, supra note 1, at 1365.
12 5 See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10 (Del. 1981); 2 ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.10 cmt. a(3), at 132; Swanson, supra note 1, at 1365 (recognizing
that the Delaware approach "applies the deferential business judgment rule in cases requiring
demand").
126 See supra Part mH.B.l.b.ii.
127 430 A.2d at 779.
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First the Court should inquire into the independence and good faith of the
committee and the bases supporting its conclusions .... If the Court determines
either that the committee is not independent or has not shown reasonable bases
for its conclusions, or, if the Court is not satisfied for other reasons relating to the
process, including but not limited to the good faith of the committee, the Court
shall deny the corporation's motion.128
Under this first step, the corporation has the burden of proving independence,
good faith, and reasonable investigation. 129 If the corporation can show "that the
committee was independent and showed reasonable bases for good faith findings
and recommendations, the Court may proceed, in its discretion, to the next
step."'130 The second step instructs that the court "should determine, applying its
own independent business judgment, whether the motion should be granted.' ' 3 1
This standard of judicial review for demand-excused cases allows for much
more judicial scrutiny of the special litigation committee's decision to terminate
the litigation.' 32 It not only directs the court to evaluate the procedures used by
the special litigation committee in making its decision, but it also allows the court
to review the reasonableness of the special litigation committee's conclusions.
More importantly, the court is also permitted to apply its own business judgment
and may review the substance of the special litigation committee's decision as
well as the merits of the underlying transaction. Therefore, the court may overrule
the committee's decision about whether the derivative action should proceed to
trial.
IV. POLICY ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED HYBRID STANDARD
Although the Delaware and ALl approaches have several similarities, careful
analysis reveals a plethora of differences. Each commentator who has developed
standards for derivative actions, including the ALI, claims to have created a more
reasonable and logical set of standards than all of the other presently existing
procedural approaches. Furthermore, each commentator aspires to develop a new
angle to separate his or her approach from all of the competing approaches.
However, perhaps the more prudent approach to this entire issue lies not so much
in developing a completely new set of standards, but in drawing upon the best
aspects of the existing standards and integrating them.
128 Id. at 788-89.
129 See id. This is the opposite of the burden of proof under the traditional business
judgment rule, which creates a presumption of independence, good faith, and reasonable
investigation, and forces the plaintiff to rebut the presumption.
13 0 1d. at 789.
131 Id. (emphasis added).
132 See, e.g., Swanson, supra note 1, at 1365 (noting that the Zapata standard "permits
broader scrutiny if demand is excused").
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The ALI and Delaware Supreme Court have spent enormous amounts of time
developing what they believe to be the proper standards for derivative actions.
Moreover, both the ALI Corporate Governance Project and the Delaware
Supreme Court are comprised of very experienced and bright corporate-legal
analysts. This Note proposes taking the best of what these two entities have to
offer regarding standards for derivative actions and integrating them into a hybrid
approach.
In general, this section proposes an overall approach that is a hybrid of the
Delaware standards and the ALT Principles. This hybrid approach consists of the
following:
(1) The ALI's universal demand rule, but with a unitary standard of judicial
review of demand rejection, rather than the ALI's present bifurcated standard that
is linked to the nature of the underlying transaction;
(2) The ALI's bifurcated standard of judicial review of special litigation
committees' motions to dismiss:
(a) For duty of care cases, the standard of review should be the business judgment
rule standard proposed by the ALI.
(b) For duty of loyalty cases, Delaware's standard of review, which requires the
court to review a special litigation committee's decision under the business
judgment rule and, in addition, permits the court to apply its own business
judgment to the allegations, is the proper standard to apply.
This hybrid approach views the procedural standards governing derivative
suits as a continuum with several gates that plaintiff-shareholders must
successfully pass through in order to bring a successful derivative suit. Universal
demand serves the initial gate-keeping role. It provides a fairly strict standard to
sift out the frivolous strike suits that are filed, but not a standard that is so strict
that even plaintiff-shareholders with valid claims have no chance of surviving a
corporation's rejection of demand.
The second gate consists of the motion to dismiss by a special litigation
committee based on its investigation of the shareholder's allegations. At this
stage, two distinct policies exist First, the second gate attempts to filter out any
meritless claims that have managed to escape dismissal at the demand stage.
Thus, a special litigation committee's conclusions about the matter should be
given some respect at this stage. Second, one can also assume that claims that
have survived demand rejection must have some merit. Therefore, the standard of
judicial review at this stage should not be too deferential to the special
committee's decision. The standards of review at this stage must balance these
competing policies of (1) giving more respect and deference to a committee's
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decisions, and (2) not being too deferential so as to prohibit valid claims from
getting to a trial on the merits.
If a plaintiff survives these first two hurdles, the third gate is a trial on the
merits. A trial should sift out any meritless actions that have managed to survive,
and presumably justice will be served because only the truly valid claims will win
at trial. This hybrid approach reflects this view of the derivative action and its
procedures.
A. Universal Demand is Best
1. Universal Demand Allows the Court to Focus on the
"Appropriate'" Issues
There are several good policy justifications for the ALI's universal demand
rule, some of which are essentially criticisms of the Delaware approach. One
valid justification is that universal demand reduces a substantial amount of
"collateral litigation" that arises in determining when demand is excused due to
futility. 133 The Delaware approach to demand-futility focuses mainly on whether
a majority of the board is independent and disinterested rather than waiting for the
133 See Coffee, supra note 4, at 254. This "collateral litigation" primarily surrounds the
issue of whether the plaintiff is excused from making demand upon the corporation because it
would be "futile." In addition, this issue of whether demand is excused under Delaware law
spawns several other issues that create litigation and consume judicial resources, such as
"whether a demand need be made, what demand concedes, what issues the demand did or did
not relate to, [and] whether shareholders who did not make demand can attack the board's
independence when other shareholders did make demand, etc." Id. Professor Coffee has also
made the following statements regarding this issue:
Delaware's demand rule also results in a substantial amount of collateral litigation and
sometimes can be a trap for the unwary. For example, issues arise as to whether (1) a
skeptical or protesting letter from a shareholder constitutes a demand (thereby waiving the
issue of board independence) or only a request for information, (2) whether a non-specific
letter from a shareholder is too indefinite to constitute a demand (and thus requires no
board response), (3) how long after demand the plaintiff must wait for a response before
filing its action, (4) how broadly a demand letter relates when there are multiple issues, and
(5) what effect does demand have when there is a subsequent change in the composition of
the board. All in all, the shareholder plaintiff faces an unattractive choice: either (1) to not
make demand and thereby accept the burden of convincing the court that seemingly
respectable directors should be deemed by the court too biased even to deserve an
opportunity to respond to demand, or (2) to make demand and thereby acknowledge the
applicability of the business judgment rule (and, for most practical purposes, concede the
outcome of the case). Neither option is attractive.
Coffee, supra note 4, at 245. In addition, the Supreme Court, in Kamen v. Kenper Financial
Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991), acknowledged that there are "high collateral litigation costs
associated with the demand futility doctrine." Id. at 106.
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board to respond to the demand and then evaluating its response.134 Thus, under
the Delaware approach, the court is forced to hear arguments on peripheral issues
such as board independence and disinterestedness instead of focusing on the
validity of the plaintiff's claims and the reasonableness of the board's rejection of
demand. In other words, universal demand shifts the focus of the litigation to the
most important issue in shareholder derivative litigation--"the central question of
the board's or committee's justifications for dismissal of the action."135 Universal
demand focuses on the board's or committee's justifications for rejecting demand
and balances the merits of the plaintiff s case against the justifications provided
by the board of directors. This is where the courts' focus should be in a derivative
action.
2. The Benefits of Universal Demand Outweigh the Costs
Demand is a relatively low-cost procedure for shareholders.136 Therefore, the
benefits that demand creates, such as providing the corporation with notice of the
allegations and potentially allowing it to conduct intracorporate dispute resolution
that will save substantial judicial resources, 137 clearly outweigh any slight
financial burden that demand places on the shareholder. Moreover, the slight
costs of making demand are much less than the substantial costs and waste of
judicial resources that are caused by the vast amount of collateral litigation that
arises under the Delaware approach. In addition, the ALI procedures for universal
134 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A2d 805, 811-15 (Del. 1984). However, in practice this
distinction may sometimes be illusory because, under the ALI approach, the board is only
permitted to have its rejection of demand be dispositive if a majority of the board members are
disinterested. If they are disinterested, they will likely reject the action and there stands a good
chance the court will dismiss the action (unless it is a duty of loyalty case in which the standard
is tougher). The same result would occur in Delaware because, if a majority of the board
members are disinterested, the case will likely fall within the demand-required category. Thus,
demand will have to be made and it will be rejected, and that decision is protected by the
business judgment rule.
Furthermore, if a majority of the board is interested, the ALI approach will not dismiss a
derivative action pursuant to the board's rejection, and that will force the board to appoint a
special litigation committee and the action will continue. Again, this is the same result as would
occur under the Delaware approach because, if a majority of the board are interested, demand is
excused and the action proceeds to the next stage at which the board will appoint a special
litigation committee. So in the end, the real difference between the two approaches is in the
standards of review, when such standards apply, and the fact that the ALI has a universal
demand rule.
135 Coffee, supra note 4, at 254.
136 See Dennis J. Block & Stephen A. Radin, The Business Judgment Rule in Shareholder
Derivative Litigation, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN SECURTEs LMGATION: PLANNING AND
STRATEGmS 157, 207 (ALI-ABA Course of Study No. C751, 1992); Swanson, supra note 1, at
1387.
137 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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demand are set up to operate quickly and efficiently so that the shareholders will
find out soon after making demand whether it has been rejected (or at least they
will be notified that the matter has been turned over to a special litigation
committee so that they can commence the derivative action). 138
3. The ALI's Universal Demand Incorporates the Strengths of the
Delaware Approach Without Incorporating Its Weaknesses
The Delaware approach of excusing demand when a majority of the board
members are interested or lack independence is based upon the rationale that
requiring a shareholder to make demand upon a board whose members are
directly interested in the derivative action is truly a practice in futility. Requiring
demand under these circumstances forces a plaintiff to waste financial resources
in maldng a demand that is guaranteed to be rejected. Moreover, allowing an
interested board to reject demand and to have the protections of the business
judgment rule in making that decision would tip the scales too far in the
corporation's and the defendant's favor.
This justification for excusing demand for futility is very sound. However,
the ALI's universal demand rule also has this requirement of board
disinterestedness and independence built into its standard. Instead of excusing
demand where a majority of the board is interested, the ALI standard requires
demand, but gives the board's response to that demand no legal weight.
The ALI's universal demand rule is the better standard. It still requires
demand and thus retains many of the benefits that demand provides, such as
giving notice to the corporation of the shareholder's allegations and enabling the
corporation to conduct intracorporate dispute resolution that could eliminate the
need for litigation. Yet, it also incorporates the policy behind the Delaware
approach that a demand-rejection by an interested board should be given no legal
deference because defendant-directors will rarely authorize litigation against
themselves. In other words, the ALI standard incorporates the valid policies
underlying the Delaware approach and, by requiring the shareholder to make
demand, also retains some of the benefits demand provides.
4. The Delaware Approach Is Too Costly and Inefficient
The costs of the Delaware demand-excused/demand-required approach
outweigh any potential benefits. The ALI's argument that this standard creates too
much "collateral litigation" rings true. Excusing demand when a majority of the
board members are interested or lack independence appears to be supported by
valid justifications. In practice, however, nearly all plaintiffs will attempt to forgo
demand by alleging futility even if the situation appears to require demand. This
138 See 2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 7.03 cmt. f, at 59-61.
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is because Delaware applies the business judgment rule to a board's decision to
reject demand in cases in which demand is required. This nearly always marks the
end of a derivative action. Thus, a plaintiff's only chance lies in pleading that
demand would be "futile." Hence, even cases whose facts require demand will be
pleaded in terms of futility. This increases the amount of litigation regarding
demand futility and drains judicial resources.
To summarize, universal demand, as established by the ALrPrinciples, is the
wiser approach. It is a low-cost step for the plaintiff, and it is based on sound
policy rationales.
B. A Unitary Standardfor Reviewing a Board's Rejection ofDemand
While the ALI's universal demand rule reflects sound policy judgments, its
standards of review of a board's rejection of demand and motion to dismiss at the
demand stage are too complicated and too strict for the purposes that demand
should serve. As stated above, the purpose of demand should be to serve an initial
gate-keeping role in a derivative action, sifting out the most frivolous claims
before they have the opportunity to waste judicial resources and force
corporations into unfounded settlements. However, judicial review of demand
rejection should not be fashioned in such a manner as to make it impossible for
even valid shareholder claims to make it past demand.
Yet, this is what at least one of the ALI standards does. As discussed in Part
III.A, the ALI has a bifurcated approach to judicial review of a board's rejection
of demand. Under section 7.04, if the underlying claim by the shareholder alleges
a violation of the duty of care, then the court must review the board's rejection of
demand (if a majority of the board is disinterested) under the standards of the
business judgment rule.139 If, on the other hand, the underlying claim alleges a
violation of the duty of loyalty, then the court must determine whether the
directors could "reasonably have determined that rejection of the demand was in
the best interests of the corporation," 140 in addition to applying the procedural
requirements of the business judgment rule.
This standard for duty of loyalty cases should be applied as a unitary standard
when the court is reviewing motions to dismiss based on demand rejection. The
ALI's standard for duty of care cases is much too strict for the demand stage. At
the demand stage, the plaintiffs are not even entitled to discovery, yet they are
forced to plead facts with particularity in an attempt to avoid having the case
dismissed. This is burdensome enough on plaintiffs without also forcing them to
overcome a standard of review that is often insurmountable even with months of
discovery. This "business judgment rule" standard swings the balance too far in
13 9 See supra Part MIA.b
140 2 ALI PRINCiLES, supra note 9, § 7.04(a)(2)(C), at 70.
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the corporation's favor. 141
The demand stage should be a preliminary screening device. The special
litigation committee and its accompanying procedures are intended to be the stage
where all but the most valid shareholder claims get dismissed. Demand should
not become a sword to be wielded by the corporation, enabling it to strike down
all potential derivative actions, whether valid or frivolous. Therefore, the ALI's
standard for duty of loyalty cases should be applied to all motions to dismiss
based on rejection of demand. It allows the court to balance the strength of the
plaintiffs allegations against the reasonableness of the board's justifications for
rejecting demand. 142 Thus, it forces the board to provide at least some detailed
justifications for why it chose to reject demand. This is appropriate considering
the fact that the corporation is the party with all of the information pertaining to
the underlying allegations.
C. The Proper Standard ofJudicial Review of Special Litigation
Committees
The ALI's approach to judicial review of special litigation committees'
decisions to terminate derivative litigation provides a bifurcated standard. It is
much like the standards of judicial review at the demand stage. This bifurcated
standard draws a sharp distinction between duty of loyalty cases and duty of care
cases. Section 7.10 provides for application of the business judgment rule to duty
of care cases, but, in duty of loyalty cases, it allows the court to evaluate the
reasonableness of a special litigation committee's justifications for seeking
termination of the derivative suit.143
While at the demand stage this bifurcated standard is an unnecessary
procedure that complicates the process of making demand and places too heavy a
burden on the plaintiff for that stage of a derivative action,144 a bifurcated
standard at the special litigation committee stage is the proper approach. It is
based on strong policy rationales, many of which the ALI has articulated.
First, judicial competence is less in duty of care cases. 145 This argument
provides that when a business decision turns out to be erroneous, there are
"multiple explanations" for it.14 6 Thus, a judge-who is not likely experienced in
141 While there are several valid justifications for having different standards of review for
duty of care and duty of loyalty cases at the special litigation committee stage, those
justifications do not apply to the demand stage, which should only serve a preliminary gate-
keeping role. See infra Part IV.C.
14 2 See supra Part IA.2.b.iii.
14 3 See supra Part II.2.
144 See supra Part IV.B.
14 5 See Coffee, supra note 4, at 262.
14 6 See id. As Professor Coffee states:
It could be that the decision-maker was negligent but, conversely, the truth may instead be
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the day-to-day business decisions made by corporate directors and officers--may
mistakenly find negligence where none exists. Therefore, the standard of judicial
review in these cases should be more deferential to the corporate committee
because the committee is much better suited to evaluate the allegations in these
cases.
In contrast, with duty of loyalty cases, "the possibility of non-culpable error is
much smaller."147 When directors allegedly exploit their positions in the
corporation for their personal financial gain, the likelihood of a legitimate
business explanation for the directors' conduct is slim. Thus, the standard of
judicial review should be more searching to ensure that self-dealing breaches of
fiduciary duties do not escape liability.
Furthermore, the ALl standard draws a very logical analogy to the traditional
approach that most courts have taken in reviewing duty of care cases, as
compared with duty of loyalty cases. Traditionally, where a case has involved
alleged violations of the duty of care, courts have applied the business judgment
rule.148 This application is based on the rationale that "courts should be reluctant
to review the acts of directors in situations where the expertise of the directors is
likely to be greater than that of the courts."
149
that a risk that was knowingly and prudently accepted simply came to unfortunate fruition.
Or, it could be that a new and unforeseeable risk arose and matured after the time the
business decision was irrevocably made.
Id.
147 Id
148 See, e.g., Shoen v. Shoen, 804 P.2d 787, 794 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) ('CThe duty of care
is evaluated according to the 'business judgment rule."'); Hall v. Staha, 800 S.W.2d 396, 399
(Ark. 1990) ("The business judgment rule is a principle of corporate governance that has been a
part of the common law for at least one hundred and fifty years."); Unitrin, Inc. v. American
Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1372-74 (Del. 1995); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872
(Del. 1985); Lussier v. Mau-Van Dev., Inc., 667 P.2d 804, 816-17 (Haw. Ct. App. 1983);
Potter v. Pohlad, 560 N.W.2d 389, 389 syllabus I (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Para-Medical
Leasing, Inc. v. Hangen, 739 P.2d 717,721 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
14 9 Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 300 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part). The Connecticut Supreme Court elaborated on this
point in Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1262 (Conn. 1994):
"[Tjhe business judgment doctrine [is] a rule of law that insulates business decisions
from most forms of review... ." The business judgment rule "expresses a sensible policy
of judicial noninterference with business decisions made in circumstances free from
serious conflicts of interest between management which makes the decisions, and the
corporation's shareholders. Not only do businessmen know more about business than
judges do, but competition in the product and labor markets and in the market for
corporate control provides sufficient punishment for businessmen who commit more than
their share of business mistakes." "IThe fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon
corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment and this reluctance to impose
liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been doctrinally labeled the business
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However, where the allegations in the case have consisted of duty of loyalty
violations, the courts have not hesitated to apply a more intense judicial review.
This is based on the justification that where the directors have conflicts of interest,
their relative expertise in business transactions is not relevant because personal
financial interest not business expertise, guides the directors' actions in these
circumstances. Judicial scrutiny is necessary in these situations to protect the
corporation and its shareholders. 150
The ALI has, by analogy, applied this traditional judicial distinction between
duty of care and duty of loyalty cases to its standards of review of special
litigation committees. This is highly sensible. During a trial on the merits in a
duty of care case, the business judgment rule is applicable because a director is
deemed to have more expertise than the courts in deciding what is a legitimate
business decision. That rationale applies with equal strength to the situation where
a corporate committee is making an investigation and determination as to whether
judgment rule."... "For efficiency reasons, corporate decision makers should be permitted
to act decisively and with relative freedom from a judge's or jury's subsequent second
questioning. It is desirable to encourage directors and officers to enter new markets,
develop new products, innovate, and take other business risks."
Id. (citations omitted); see also Frances v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 723 P.2d 573, 582 n.14
(Cal. 1986) (noting that one justification for the business judgment rule is "that directors should
be given wide latitude in their handling of corporate affairs because the hindsight of the judicial
process is an imperfect device for evaluating business decisions"); In re Caremark Int'l Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating that judges are "ill-equipped"
to "second-guess[ ]" directors' business decisions within the context of the duty of care); Alford
v. Shaw, 349 S.E.2d 41, 47 n.5 (N.C. 1986) (stating that the rationales behind the business
judgment rule include the recognition that "management decisions are more properly the
province of directors selected by shareholders rather than of a judge; and as a matter ofjudicial
economy, the rule relieves the courts from involvement in complicated business questions');
Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1046 (Pa. 1997) (stating that the business judgment rule
reflects the policy that corporate management knows what is best for the corporation, and, thus,
judges should not second-guess directors in most situations); Dennis Honabach & Roger
Dennis, The Seventh Circuit and the Market for Corporate Control, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 681,
686 (1991) ("Courts frequently announce that they are reluctant to review the acts of directors
because they lack the expertise to evaluate the wisdom of business decisions.").
150 Judge Cudahy provided a good explanation of this issue in Panter v. Marshall Field &
Co.:
But, where the directors are afflicted with a conflict of interest, relative expertise is no
longer crucial. Instead, the great danger becomes the channeling of the directors' expertise
along the lines of their personal advantage-sometimes at the expense of the corporation
and its stockholders. Here courts have no rational choice but to subject challenged conduct
of directors and questioned corporate transactions to their own disinterested scrutiny. Of
course, the self-protective bias of interested directors may be entirely devoid of corrupt
motivation, but it may nonetheless constitute a serious threat to stockholder welfare.
646 F.2d at 300 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
[Vol. 60:241
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
a derivative action alleging violations of the duty of care is in the best interests of
the corporation. The directors on the committee are better equipped than the court
to make the decision because they have more expertise than the judge to
determine whether a director made a negligent business decision. Furthermore,
the decision whether the derivative action is in the best interests of the corporation
is essentially a business decision. 151 In a practical sense, then, it should be given
the same traditional deference that business decisions involving the duty of care
have always been given.
Likewise, in duty of loyalty cases, the ALI permits more judicial review of a
special committee's investigation and conclusion. Courts have long exercised
more judicial review of allegations of duty of loyalty violations.152 Hence, they
should be permitted to exercise that increased scrutiny when a committee has
determined that a shareholder's duty of loyalty allegations against the
corporation's directors should be dismissed. Also, from a practical standpoint
judges have traditionally been much more active in reviewing duty of loyalty
allegations. Thus, regardless of any policy justifications, they will be more
experienced at judicial review in this area and should make fewer mistakes.
Another justification for the ALI standard is that the duty of care is "self-
policing."'1 53 If corporate directors act negligently in making business decisions,
the market will flesh out these directors and dismiss them in favor of more
responsible directors. The negligence will be bome out because the corporation
will become less competitive in the market. In other words, the competitive
corporate market will force directors to act as responsibly as possible because no
corporation is going to retain a director or officer who continuously makes poor
business decisions. 154
151 See, e.g., Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508,518 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
152 See, e.g., Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1145 (Del. 1990); Coggins v. New
England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1117 (Mass. 1986); American Discount
Corp. v. Kaitz, 206 N.E.2d 156, 160 (Mass. 1965); Geller v. Allied-Lyons PLC, 674 N.E.2d
1334, 1336-37 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997); Honn v. Coin & Stamp Gallery, Inc., 407 N.W2d 419,
422 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126, 1131 (Wyo. 1985); see also
Daniel B. Bogart, Liability of Directors of Chapter 11 Debtors in Possession: "Don't Look
Back-Something May be Gaining on You," 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 155, 175 (1994) ("Courts
more closely scrutinize duty of loyalty than duty of care violations."); Honabach & Dennis,
supra note 149, at 686 (stating that courts have traditionally applied more judicial scrutiny to
allegations that corporate directors breached their duty of loyalty); Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping
the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351,
1363 (1989) (noting that courts have traditionally subjected the duty of loyalty to strict judicial
scrutiny); Jacqueline M. Veneziani, Causation and Injury in Corporate Control Transactions:
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 69 WAsH. L. REv. 1167, 1172 (1994) ("Courts historically
have scrutinized alleged violations of the duty of loyalty more thoroughly than violations of the
duty of care.").
153 Coffee, supra note 4, at 262.
154 See, e.g., Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1262 (Conn. 1994)
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In contrast, with duty of loyalty violations, the incentive to commit self-
dealing is much higher and the potential for detection is less.155 As Professor
Coffee, the reporter for the ALPrinciples, notes, self-dealing tends to perpetuate
itself.1 56 Thus, judicial scrutiny must be more searching in order to detect and
deter this harmful conduct.
The ALI's justifications for distinguishing between duty of care cases and
duty of loyalty cases are very compelling. Furthermore, it is more logical to tailor
the standards of judicial review to the nature of the allegations of the underlying
transaction than it is to tailor the standards to whether a majority of the board is
independent and disinterested-as Delaware does. While independence and
disinterestedness should play a role in what standards apply-especially at the
demand stage-they should not be the key elements that trigger the applicable
standard at the special litigation committee stage. Thus, the ALI bifurcated
standard of judicial review, which is keyed to the nature of the underlying
transaction, is based on stronger policies and rationales than the Delaware
approach.
D. Delaware's "Independent Business Judgment" Standard Should Be
Applied in Duty ofLoyalty Cases
There is one significant flaw in the ALI's bifurcated approach. Its standard of
review in duty of loyalty cases-while providing for more judicial scrutiny than
in duty of care cases-does not permit enough judicial scrutiny of special
litigation committee termination decisions. Even though the court is permitted to
review the reasonableness of the special litigation committee's conclusions, the
ALI does not permit the court to apply its own business judgment to the
allegations. This is where the Delaware standard for demand-excused cases is the
superior rule.
The Delaware standard provides for substantial judicial scrutiny in demand-
(C'The press of market forces... will more effectively serve the interests of all participants than
will an error-prone judicial process.").
155 For instance, suppose a corporate director highly recommends to the rest of the board
that the corporation enter into a transaction with company X. The director's secret motivation is
that he is also a controlling shareholder and director of company X, and, thus, he stands to make
a considerable profit from the transaction. In addition, assume that the director recommends this
transaction with company X rather than a similar transaction with company Y. Although the
transaction with company X will be profitable for the corporation, the transaction with company
Y would have allowed the corporation to realize a much higher profit. If the board of directors
authorizes the transaction with company X, the director may very well have violated his duty of
loyalty to the corporation by zealously recommending the less profitable transaction with
company X over company Y. Yet, because the transaction with company X was still profitable
for the corporation, the market may not flesh out this duty of loyalty violation, and, thus,
traditional market forces will not constrain the director's conduct.156 See Coffee, supra note 4, at 262.
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excused cases. It requires the court to review the special litigation committee's
decision to see if the committee was independent, acted in good faith, and made
reasonable conclusions.' 57 Furthermore, the corporation has the burden of
proving that the committee met these requirements. 58 More importantly, it also
permits the court to apply its own business judgment to the facts of the underlying
transaction.
This standard that Delaware has adopted for its demand-excused cases should
be applied with the ALI approach where the underlying transaction is alleged to
be a violation of the duty of loyalty. Violations of the duty of loyalty are likely to
consist of egregious self-dealing, and the courts should be able to thoroughly
scrutinize any decision by a special litigation committee that recommends
dismissal of an action alleging such conduct Furthermore, as discussed above,
courts have been performing a more intense judicial review of alleged duty of
loyalty violations for decades and are well-equipped to perform the type of
scrutiny that the Delaware demand-excused standard entails.159
Moreover, a defendant-director who is accused of self-dealing may be more
inclined to take advantage of any structural bias that may exist among corporate
directors in order to avoid liability. It cannot be ignored that some structural bias
exists among directors-regardless of whether they are outside and independent.
These directors are all part of the same social class. They often attended the same
universities, they mingle within the same social circles, and they have the same
general economic interests and positions in society. When one of these directors is
facing liability, the others will tend to close ranks, if for no other reason than the
"there, but for the grace of God go r 160 rationale.
Once certain types of director conduct are held by the courts to be violations
of the duty of loyalty, the floodgates may open, and other directors may face
liability through a derivative action. Thus, even if these "independent" directors
who serve on special litigation committees take the task very seriously and intend
to make a good faith effort-as most of them probably do-these psychological
influences of bias may still make them reluctant to reach a decision that clears the
way for their fellow directors to get hit for millions of dollars in liability.
While this presence of structural bias is not problematic enough to overcome
the well-founded justifications for application of the business judgment rule in
duty of care cases, there are no such compelling justifications in duty of loyalty
157 See supra Part I.H3.1.b.
158 Typically, the business judgment nile acts as a presumption; therefore, the plaintiff-
shareholder has the burden of proving that the standards of the business judgment rule were not
met. See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1374 (Del. 1995); Spiegel v.
Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 774 (Del. 1990). Under the Delaware standard, however, the
defendant-corporation has the burden of proof.
159 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
160 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).
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cases.161 Thus, the Delaware standard, which allows for full independent judicial
review by the court; rather than the present ALI standard, is the better standard to
apply in duty of loyalty cases. The Delaware standard allows the court to evaluate
fully the merits of the plaintiffs allegations as well as the special litigation
committee's justifications for its decisions, whereas the present ALI standard for
duty of loyalty cases only allows the court to scratch the surface by checking if
the committee's justifications are "reasonable."
The Delaware standard goes much further by allowing the court to draw its
own conclusions and even second-guess the committee if it believes such action
is warranted. Thus, the Delaware standard fully protects against the danger of
special litigation committees displaying structural bias by blindly concluding that
a derivative action is not in the best interests of the corporation 162 and hiding this
arbitrary decision under the guise of thorough investigation and impeccable
procedures. In other words, the Delaware standard prevents committees from
being able to present justifications for termination that look good on their face,
but are, in reality, completely arbitrary.
V. CONCLUSION
The AL! Principles and the Delaware courts have been two of the major
developers of procedural standards for shareholder derivative suits. By drawing
on the best aspects of each of their various standards, one is able to create a set of
standards that best satisfies the variety of competing policy justifications
underlying the derivative suit. The hybrid approach proposed by this Note does
this by combining certain aspects of the ALI Principles and the Delaware
approach. In particular, the hybrid proposal adopts the ALI's universal demand
rule with one significant change. Instead of a bifurcated standard of review, there
should be a unitary standard at the demand stage in which the court evaluates the
reasonableness of the board's rejection of demand. Next, at the special litigation
committee stage, the ALI's bifurcated approach, which draws a sharp distinction
161 As discussed above, determining violations of the duty of care can be a very complex
and uncertain task. Any number of things can cause a business decision to turn sour. What
initially was an unforeseen risk may, in hindsight, look like director or officer negligence. This
concern, plus the fact that fellow corporate directors will likely have more expertise than a court
at sifting through the possible causes of a poor business transaction, outweighs any potential
structural bias that may exist Thus, application of the business judgment rule is warranted.
Furthermore, in duty of care cases, there is an additional check on negligent director
conduct. Even if it is not caught by a derivative action, the competitive market forces at work in
the corporate community will likely dispose of negligent and inefficient directors. However,
these rationales are not present in duty of loyalty cases, and, thus, the balance tips in favor of
increased judicial scrutiny in such cases.
162 It has been shown that the overwhelming majority of special litigation committees
conclude that maintaining the derivative suit is not in the best interests of the corporation. See
MAGNUSON, supra note 10, § 8.17, at 58 & n.13.
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between duty of loyalty and duty of care cases, should be applied. It is based on
more compelling policies than the Delaware demand-excused/demand-required
approach.
However, the ALI's standard of judicial review for duty of loyalty cases still
falls short of the amount of judicial review that is necessary to prevent special
litigation committees from arbitrarily terminating valid derivative suits. Thus, the
superior standard is Delaware's demand-excused approach, which permits the
court-at its discretion-to exercise its independent judgment of the merits of the
action and the validity of the special litigation committee's conclusions. This
combination of the ALI Principles and the Delaware standard of judicial review
strikes the best balance between the interests of shareholders in bringing
derivative actions and the interests of the corporation and its directors-who are
the true "managers" of the corporation-in handling corporate affairs.

